

A FAILURE TO MODERNIZE:  
THE ORIGINS OF 20<sup>th</sup> CENTURY  
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

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At the height of the Islamic Empire, the Muslim community was a world leader in both economic status and military strength. However, the Islamic world's failure to modernize its cultural, political, and economic systems has resulted in widespread financial ruin. The inability of the Muslim world to compete in the globalized economy has resulted in chronic poverty and illiteracy, creating conditions in which frustrated youth are willing to embrace new and radical ideologies with the goal of instituting significant change in their societies. Augmented by a history of Western imperialism and aggression upon Muslim lands, modern fundamentalism has grown out of a belief that in order to correct the economic failures that plague the Islamic world, Muslims must disregard all Western influences and return both culturally and spiritually to a time when Islamic society was most dominant.

Established by the Prophet Muhammad in Mecca and Medina, Islam spread rapidly with the territorial victories of Muslim armies. By the time of Muhammad's death in 632 AD,

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virtually the entire Arabian Peninsula was united under the banner of Islam. In the centuries following Muhammad's death, known as their Classical Age, the Islamic armies defeated the Byzantine Empire, and also conquered the lands of Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and North Africa. The early conquests set a precedent for a culture in which religion, society, and government were closely intertwined, which is still characteristic of many Islamic societies to this day.<sup>1</sup> It was also during this period that the notion of a United Islamic community (*ummah*) became paramount, as Muslim leaders strove to focus on religious connections rather than ethnic or linguistic barriers.<sup>2</sup> The notion of a Pan-Islamic identity has been a powerful force in fundamentalist revivals, and as a result fundamentalists continue to oppose nationalism, believing it to be a divisive influence.

Although the Islamic world remained largely unified for several centuries, the central government of the Arab world collapsed following the Mongol invasion and destruction of Baghdad in 1258. In the period of turmoil that followed, military commanders (sultans) became the dominant political force. This system continued into the 16<sup>th</sup> century, when the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mogul empires, known as the "gunpowder empires," were formed.

In addition to the military might of the Muslim empires, the Islamic community was also a world leader in the arts and sciences. While Christian Europe remained mired in the Dark Ages, the Muslim world accomplished significant innovations in science—medicine, philosophy, chemistry, and astronomy—as well as art and architecture. Indeed, Europeans coming out of the Dark Ages learned a great deal from the accomplishments of Muslim scientists who preceded them.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, despite these intercultural communications in the sciences, overall interaction between the Islamic Empires and Christian Europe was limited.

While the gunpowder empires were originally able to ignore the scientific, military, and intellectual advancements of Europe as it progressed out of the Dark Ages, the Islamic states

were eventually forced to recognize the changing balance in world power. At some point in their histories, virtually all Muslim states attempted to adopt European innovations, and in the process to modernize central tenets of their own societies, an extremely formidable challenge that almost universally failed.

One of the greatest obstacles faced by the gunpowder empires was the generally conservative mindset of the Muslim world. Before the creation of the Western system of constant reinvestment and renovation, societies could not expand beyond a certain point. As a result, the overall focus of many Muslim nations was not innovation, but rather preserving the knowledge and technology that already existed.<sup>4</sup> Thus, societies such as the Ottomans saw little need for experimentation, focusing instead on consolidating and reinforcing what was already known. Additionally, religious leaders in both the Ottoman and Safavid empires urged conservatism and orthodoxy, since they feared intellectual speculation would corrupt and tarnish the basic principles of Islam as well as diminish their own considerable power and influence.<sup>5</sup>

Another significant obstacle towards reform was consistent governmental corruption and decay. The Ottoman government became dominated by dishonest officials, who abused their offices by buying and selling appointments. Many government officials resisted modernization, fearing that a more transparent government would result.<sup>6</sup> In the Safavid Empire, reformist leaders often faced the difficult challenge of receiving religious approval for their actions. Because of the power and prestige of the clergy, any reforms that the government proposed had to be approved by the religious leaders, thus making the adoption of European culture and technology extremely difficult.<sup>7</sup>

The Ottoman government and Safavid empires were also considerably weakened by localization, as regional military and tribal leaders possessed a great deal of power.<sup>8</sup> Within the Ottoman Empire, which expanded constantly, ties between the central bureaucracy and newly conquered regions began strongly, only to weaken over time. Eventually, the Ottoman Empire was less of a

unified state than a grouping of semi-autonomous provinces, more focused on their own self-interest than that of the central government.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, as local leaders increased their influence, they were even more resistant to yielding any of their authority to a central administration.

Strides towards modernization were also hindered by a widespread reluctance to undertake military reform. As the European powers continued to grow and innovate in military capability, the Ottoman Empire lacked the necessary resources to compete with the new weapons and technology. However, the government faced a great deal of resistance to reform from the military itself. The long-established *Janissary* corps defied any attempts towards reform, because they feared losing the many privileges they enjoyed.<sup>10</sup> Despite this resistance, however, beginning in the 1730s the Ottoman government attempted to modernize its military along European lines, bringing in French and Italian drill instructors. The most ardent attempts at reform occurred under the reign of Sultan Selim III, who ruled from 1789 to 1807. However, while groundbreaking in his belief in new European technologies, Selim III believed that the shortcomings of the Ottoman Empire were purely military, and therefore he ignored political, social, economic and judicial reform.<sup>11</sup> As a result, his attempts at reform proved ineffective and short-lived.

As a whole, reform movements in the Ottoman Empire generally occurred as a reaction to a military loss or economic decline. Once the immediate threat had passed, therefore, the government generally ignored new calls for modernization. A cycle thus occurred in which the Ottomans would adopt many helpful European institutions, only to fall behind once again due to apathy towards new technology. The modernization efforts were further hampered by the manner in which Ottoman leaders adopted Western institutions selectively, usually upon military grounds, and therefore did not prepare their people for the intellectual ideals of European democracies.<sup>12</sup>

Overall, it is evident that the Ottomans took many steps towards modernization and reform, but realized the need too late

and modernized too little. The task of keeping pace with European innovations was monumental, and would have required the restructuring of Ottoman society. Indeed, such profound transformations would have forced the Ottomans to sacrifice many links with their Islamic heritage.<sup>13</sup> As a result, many of the most passionate anti-reformists came from within the religious clergy, who feared that reform would tarnish the core messages of Islam.<sup>14</sup>

To have remained on a level militarily, socially, and economically with Christian Europe, the Ottomans would have had to sacrifice a large segment of their culture, adopting in its place foreign ideals and institutions. Having largely resisted modernization, however, the Ottomans inevitably fell far behind the West. The first of the major defeats that indicated the imbalance between the two societies occurred in 1492, when the Moors were driven out of Spain, effectively ending any territorial ambition that Muslim armies had in conquering Western Europe. Another significant European victory occurred in 1571 at the Battle of Lepanto in the Gulf of Patras, in which the Christian fleet overwhelmingly defeated the Ottoman navy. Many more European victories followed, including the failed Muslim siege of Vienna in 1683, the withdrawal from Hungary in 1686, and the loss of Azov in 1696 to the Holy Roman Empire. This led to the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699, in which the Ottomans lost significant territory as well as their superpower status, and they lost even more land at the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718 and the Treaty of Kucuck Kaynarca in 1774. Although it remained intact through the end of World War I, the Ottoman Empire was anything but the dominant force it was at its height, and in the Treaty of Versailles was placed under Western mandate all the way through the Second World War.<sup>15</sup>

While the failure of the gunpowder empires to successfully modernize their nations appears to be unrelated to modern Islamic societies, the chronic inability to adopt superior European technology foreshadowed the difficulties faced by the Muslim world in today's globalized economy. Many Islamic societies currently lag behind Western cultures in scientific achievements, the

status of women, and democratic governments. Although this is not true for every Muslim society, the overall failure to redefine these institutions and social structures impedes the Islamic world's ability to compete economically, thus leading to a disastrous economic climate ripe for fundamentalist recruitment.

As already discussed, the Muslim world was for many centuries far more scientifically advanced than Europe. However, because Muslim scientists were slow to acknowledge European innovations and continued to focus upon discoveries already made by previous generations, they have been significantly outpaced by their European counterparts, and continue to trail other cultures in scientific research and medicine to this day.

The Islamic world's perspective on issues of women's rights also stands in sharp contrast to global trends. Although under *shari'a* women are given extensive property rights, the *Qur'an* imposes severe social and legal restrictions on women, and Islamic guidelines permits both polygamy and concubines.<sup>16</sup> Indeed, when Muslim writers from the gunpowder empires first began traveling to Europe, they observed the status of women to be one of the greatest contrasts between Islamic and Western cultures. Many of these emissaries felt that European women were immodest and blatantly sexual, and granted too much freedom by their male counterparts.<sup>17</sup>

The stark contrast between the Muslim world and the West with respect to roles and status of women continues to be significant and obvious. The majority of fundamentalist Muslims today perceive their treatment of women not as subjugation, but rather as "protecting" them from the corruption of Western influences.<sup>18</sup> Family has always been the core of the Islamic identity, and many believe that the veil preserves the modesty and dignity of women.<sup>19</sup> Fundamentalists continue to perceive Western women as chiefly sexual objects, and extremists are therefore spiteful of European and American lifestyles. They also feel threatened by the role of women in Western societies, as they fear such influences seeping into their own culture and corrupting their citizens.<sup>20</sup>

Perhaps the most devastating and widespread failure in the Islamic world is the lack of free and open democracies. Successful democratic governments have been infrequent, particularly in the Arab World, as democracy faces both religious and social impediments in Muslim cultures.

Islamic doctrine preaches that God is the sole sovereign and source of law, and beginning with the conquests of the Prophet, the Muslim empire was built as a religious state. Government and religion continue to be indivisible in many Islamic cultures, and there is significant debate as to whether democracy wrongly substitutes human judgment for God's judgment.<sup>21</sup> While every society needs some administrative power to ensure stability and order, democracy is controversial to some extremists because it relies almost universally upon human judgment and prejudices.

Despite this debate, a far greater challenge to the implementation of democracy comes from authoritarian and abusive governments, that employ a variety of methods to ensure their power, especially through absolute control of state resources. Indeed, the greatest obstacle to democracy in many autocratically led nations is the tremendous oil revenues throughout the Middle East. Although oil is a widespread and valuable resource in the region, it allows governments to maintain a stranglehold over the economic interests of their nations, as rulers of Arab countries tend to have complete control over the drilling process and the allocation of oil funds.<sup>22</sup> For example, out of the \$7 billion in oil revenue generated in 1999 in Saudi Arabia, \$4 billion went to the Saudi Royal family or its associates.<sup>23</sup> Oil revenues are not spent on reform, but rather support corruption, and widen social gaps within societies. Furthermore, oil production impedes the creation of diversified economies, as societies built around natural resources do not lend themselves to a heterogeneous workforce or foreign investment.<sup>24</sup> Finally, because oil revenue allows the government to subsist without taxing the populace, the people have little leverage with which to oppose the actions of the state.

In addition to oil profits, Arab governments use many other means to ensure that democracy does not flourish. One

method is the abuse of religion—for example, when autocratic regimes use principles of *shari'a* to restrict rights and liberties such as freedom of speech.<sup>25</sup> Another means is through the encouragement of political apathy, and providing elections only when the government's hold on power is assured. Autocratic regimes also encourage ethnic cleavages within their countries, such as the animosity between Arabs and Kurds in Iraq.<sup>26</sup>

Extreme fundamentalists are almost universally opposed to democracy, which they view as contrary to Islamic principles and the complete surrender to God that is required of Muslims. Such sentiments were expressed by the Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran, who claimed that democracy “leads to prostitution.”<sup>27</sup> His words are echoed by Iraqi insurgent leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who, in the days preceding the Iraqi elections of 2005, proclaimed, “We have declared an all-out war on this evil principle of democracy and those who follow this wrong ideology.”

The consistent effort by the governments of many Muslim nations to limit democratic expression is the primary reason that the Middle East has one of the poorest ratings of political freedom in the world. Under Freedom House's seven-point scale, with 1.0 being the most free and 7.0 the least free, the Middle East averages a rating of 5.53.<sup>28</sup> Sixteen Arab states have no democracies, and these countries average a freedom level of 5.81, compared to the worldwide average of 3.16.<sup>29</sup> More troubling is that the average level of freedom in the Middle East has over the years declined rather than increased.

The result of the Islamic world's hesitancy to undergo reform clearly impacts the economic health of Muslim countries. In 1999, the combined GDP of all Arab countries equaled \$531.2 billion, which is smaller than that of Spain, and the World Bank estimates that in 2000 the average annual income in Muslim countries was half of the world's average.<sup>30</sup> In addition to its generally weak economies, the Islamic world has undergone a population explosion, in which the population of all Arab countries combined has increased from 55 million in 1930, to 90 million in 1960, to 179 million in 1979. This has resulted in an

unusually young population, and by 1980 over 40% of the Arab population was under 15 years old.<sup>31</sup> Because there are so many young Arab men and women seeking jobs, unemployment is approximately 15% for the entire region.<sup>32</sup>

Given the damning nature of these statistics, it is not surprising that there currently exists a large class of poor, unemployed, and frustrated youth in the Middle East today. The Muslim world trails the West in job creation, education, technology, and productivity; however, many of the economic troubles of the Arab world are still blamed on globalization and Western economic domination.<sup>33</sup>

It is from this climate of poverty that Islamic fundamentalists recruit, looking to find Muslims frustrated with society and willing to embrace radical change. For many fundamentalists, the failures of their own society are transformed into a hatred of the West, and the materialism and economic domination that it represents. Radicals desire a return to the height of the Islamic empire, which is why fundamentalists call for a rejection of other cultures and advocate a return to an older, purer form of Islamic devotion. Modernity as a whole has failed the Islamic world, with only a small, often elite portion of society truly benefiting from innovations.<sup>34</sup> Fundamentalists believe that by encouraging conservatism and resisting reform, they are defending their culture from *an external threat*, which is why they advocate a return to the founding principles of Islam, hence the term Islamic “fundamentalism.”

Islamic fundamentalism flourishes as a result of the influence of a variety of cultures and individuals, and there is no single figure responsible for the rise of religious radicalism. However, the founding of Wahhabism is regarded as one of the most significant movements to shape the ideology of modern fundamentalism.

Wahhabism was founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), who was born on the Saudi peninsula. He was educated in Mecca and Medina, where he was taught a particularly conservative and virulent interpretation of Islam. Al-

Wahhab was not an intellectual, and published few written works, but his fiery passion and oratory skills attracted a significant following to his fundamentalist teachings. Followers of al-Wahhab, known commonly as Wahhabites, favor the title *muwahhidun* (unifiers).<sup>35</sup> In their beliefs, however, Wahhabites reject many practices and teachings that are universally accepted by other Muslims.<sup>36</sup> In 1746, al-Wahhab made a formal declaration of jihad against all infidels and apostates, which allowed him to kill other Muslims under the justification that they had deviated from true Islamic teachings.

Wahhabism was literalist, rigid, and exclusive, and rather than adherent to precedents its followers advocated *ijtihad* (independent analysis). Although Wahhabites did not completely reject the work of earlier scholars, they believed that the only sources from which to base a true Islamic lifestyle were the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, the *Qur'an*, and the Sunnah.<sup>37</sup> Wahhabites also emphasized the oneness of God, and therefore denounced the reverence of Muhammad and other holy figures as examples of *shirk* (polytheism).<sup>38</sup> While opposed to all Shia and many Sunni groups, the Wahhabites hated above all Sufism because of its mysticism and its tolerance.

Al-Wahhab and his followers launched a war of purification against mainstream Islamic ideology, and often killed anyone who did not share their beliefs. Heavily anti-intellectual, they burned all books that did not conform to Wahhabi interpretations of Islam, and their goal was to eliminate Muslims who they believed degraded Islamic values through modernity.<sup>39</sup>

While the Wahhabist movement was significant throughout the 1700s, Wahhabist teachings would not have continued to reverberate throughout the Muslim world were it not for the strong connection between Wahhabites and the Sa'udi monarchy. The relationship began with an alliance between al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Sa'ud, a local ruler who desired to further his military ambitions.<sup>40</sup> Al-Wahhab provided religious justification for ibn Sa'ud's pillaging of rival communities, and in return ibn Sa'ud allowed al-Wahhab to spread the teachings of Wahhabism.

By the time of al-Wahhab's death in 1792, ibn Sa'ud's forces had conquered significant territory. In 1803, they captured the holy city of Mecca, where they destroyed the tomb of the Prophet and tombs of the caliphs, which they denounced as examples of *shirk*.<sup>41</sup>

Because al-Wahhab's teachings challenged the legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire, ibn Sa'ud's forces were defeated by the Egyptian army in 1818, which essentially ended the first Sa'udi state. However, Wahhabism was successful in proving to other Muslim extremists that religious purification was possible,<sup>42</sup> and the Saudi empire was revitalized under Abdulaziz ibn Sa'ud (1879-1953). The new regime was bolstered by the support of the British, who signed a treaty with the Sa'udis as a countermeasure against the Ottoman Empire during World War I.<sup>43</sup>

The presence of Wahhabist influences in Sa'udi Arabia today is a significant force in the worldwide fundamentalist movement. Although the "Wahhabi threat" is a phrase that is often overused and over-generalized in describing radical Islamic movements, Wahhabism is nevertheless one of the great sources for both fundamentalist ideology and funding.

Like many other states in the Middle East, Sa'udi Arabia derives a significant majority of its income through oil production, which is tightly controlled by the Sa'udi Royal Family. Without Sa'udi support, Wahhabism would have existed as an extremist group on the fringe of Islamic teachings. However, because of the money given to religious groups by the government, advocates of Wahhabism have tremendous resources with which to spread their message throughout the Muslim world. Wahhabites fund educational centers, mosques, and religious materials, through which they propagate their extremist doctrine.<sup>44</sup>

Although the relationship between the Sa'udi Royal Family and Wahhabism continues, the future of the alliance is constantly in jeopardy. The relationship is crafted out of convenience, since although ideologically opposed, both the monarchy and Wahhabites benefit in securing status and prosperity. However, as the relationship between the Sa'udi government and the West has strengthened, fundamentalist groups have become increasingly

hostile towards the Royal Family, which many perceive as nothing short of a Western puppet, and have gone so far as to call for its overthrow.<sup>45</sup>

In addition to al-Wahhab, there have been many articulate, forceful, and well-published fundamentalist authors of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, whose work has served as the ideological pillar for the radical movements. Three of the most influential and well known are Hasan al-Banna, Abul Ala Mawdudi, and Sayyid Qutb.

Hasan al-Banna was born in 1908 as the son of an Islamic judge in Egypt. A schoolteacher by profession, al-Banna despised the secular constitution established in Egypt in 1923, believing it to be too lenient on Western vices such as drinking, gambling, and prostitution, and was convinced that the adoption of European customs had significantly harmed Egyptian society.<sup>46</sup> Al-Banna blamed Westerners and modernized Muslims for tarnishing Islamic practices, and believed that a return to a purer form of worship would lead to a worldwide Islamic revolution.<sup>47</sup> While al-Banna believed in achieving modernity, in his view economic reform had to be accompanied by spiritual reform, and he furthermore advocated that Egyptians base reforms on their own culture rather than that of the Europeans.<sup>48</sup> He also held that *shari'a* was the ideal model for society's laws, and advocated that Islam be imposed upon all of Egyptian society "by force if necessary."<sup>49</sup> Al-Banna created an extensive six-point plan for reinvigorating Islamic society, which included reinterpreting the *Qur'an* to meet modern needs, creating a united Islamic national block, raising the living standards of the Muslim community, reducing illiteracy and poverty, ejecting foreigners from Muslim lands, and promoting peace across the Islamic world.<sup>50</sup> His plans were never realized, however, for on February 12, 1949 he was assassinated by the Egyptian government.

Another important fundamentalist intellectual was Abul Ala Mawdudi, a journalist who founded Jamaat-i-Islami (Islamic Society) in 1941. Mawdudi believed that the West was threatening to destroy Islamic values, and called for a universal jihad for Muslim groups to seize governmental control.<sup>51</sup> While Mawdudi

recognized the need for reform in order to meet the challenges of modernity, he believed that Islam was self-sufficient and could modernize without foreign interference.<sup>52</sup> His greatest focus was on the sovereignty of God, a principle that led to his eventual rejection of democracy. "It is neither for us to decide the aim and purpose of our existence nor to prescribe the limits of our worldly authority," he said, "nor is anyone else entitled to make these decisions for us ... God alone is the Sovereign, and His commandments the Law of Islam."<sup>53</sup>

Although al-Banna and Mawdudi are recognized as early ideological leaders in the creation of Islamic radicalism, Sayyid Qutb is universally acknowledged as the most widely published and influential fundamentalist. Born in Cairo in 1906, Qutb grew up enamored with Western culture, and studied English literature in college. He worked for the Egyptian Ministry of Education, and lived in the United States from November 1948 to August 1950 on a study mission. During the course of his stay; however, Qutb's view of Western culture shifted radically. He became disgusted with the United States, and perceived its political, economic, and social institutions as corrupt and dangerous to Islamic values.<sup>54</sup> He also believed America lacked moral values, and that its women were sexually promiscuous. In his later writing, he described his experience of America as "...living in a large brothel! One has only to glance at its press, films, adhesion shows, beauty contests, ball-rooms, wine bars, and broadcasting stations! Or observe its mad lust for naked flesh, provocative postures, and sick, suggestive statements in literature, the arts and the mass media!"<sup>55</sup> Qutb also focused extensively on what he perceived as the crass materialism of American society. "Look at this capitalism with its monopolies, its usury...at this individual freedom, devoid of human sympathy and responsibility for relatives except under force of law; at this materialistic attitude which deadens the spirit; at this behavior, like animals, which you call 'free mixing of the sexes'; at this vulgarity which you call 'emancipation of women'; at this evil and fanatic racial discrimination."<sup>56</sup> He also found America to be spiritually void, and believed that religion had been corrupted by the sexual degradation and materialism of the society.<sup>57</sup>

Unsurprisingly, Qutb's experiences in America led him to believe that Islam had to resist all Western influences in order to remain spiritually pure. Such sentiments are expressed when he wrote "The spirit of Islam [is] effective...as long as the lands of Islam remains far from the influence of the materialistic Western civilization." Qutb, who was profoundly influenced by Mawdudi, advocated a Pan-Islamic nationalism for the entire Muslim world.<sup>58</sup> He argued against both the concepts of democracy and the separation of church and state, saying "[Islam] cannot be rightly practiced in isolation from society. Its people cannot be Muslims if they do not put it into effect in their social, legal and economic system."<sup>59</sup> He also insisted that the separation of church and state was imported from the West, and like all other Western innovations would only end up corrupting Islamic societies. Instead, he called for "...a restoration of Islamic life in an Islamic society governed by the Islamic creed and the Islamic conception as well as by the Islamic *Shari'a* and the Islamic system."<sup>60</sup> Qutb urged an Islamic approach to all reforms, saying, "...we announce our defeat from the first round if we adopt Western thought as the means of reviving Islamic thought. We must first be freed from the Western way of thinking and we must adopt an essentially Islamic way of thinking to assure that the ensuing result will be pure and not faulty."<sup>61</sup>

Qutb's work was inspirational to Muslims disillusioned by European colonialism who desired a release from the poverty and corruption of their own societies.<sup>62</sup> His work created within the Muslim world a substantially more comprehensive (and biased) picture of the United States than had ever existed. Upon his return to Egypt from his stay in America, he quit the Education Ministry and in 1953 joined the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood. Following an assassination attempt on Egyptian President Nasser, Qutb was imprisoned in 1954, and sentenced to 15 years of hard labor. While in prison, his radicalism only increased, and he was executed in 1966 because his work *Milestones* called for the overthrow of the Egyptian government.<sup>63</sup>

Provided the necessary conditions are present, Islamic fundamentalism will always exist as a response to discontent and anger within the Muslim world. The current Islamic revolution is not the result of any single occurrence or event, but rather an accumulation of factors that has resulted in widespread poverty, and resentment towards the West. Muslims throughout the world feel shame and anger because although many of their governments have tried to implement some measure of reform, the overall quality of life has not improved.<sup>64</sup> Islamic populations are angry about a broad range of problems, including feelings of lost identity among Muslims, failed political systems, stagnant economies, high unemployment rates, a lack of social programs, and large gaps between the rich and poor.<sup>65</sup> In the eyes of many, Western reforms have failed, and religious fundamentalism is appealing because it calls for action and progress rather than societal stagnation, and guarantees its adherents a brighter future.<sup>66</sup> Furthermore, although autocratic governments can easily and often suppress political opposition, regimes have little control over what is taught in mosques and at prayer meetings.

In order to achieve an Islamic utopia, one of the foremost aims of the fundamentalist movement is the purification of its own societies. Therefore, although the West is universally regarded as corrupt, the greatest enemies of fundamentalists are the Arab modernizers, those who do not belong to the "City of Faith."<sup>67</sup> Uniformity, also known as *tawhid* (oneness), is a crucial value in radicalist ideology, and fundamentalists unite behind the *Qur'an* because it is universal regardless of ethnic or linguistic differences.<sup>68</sup> Fundamentalists believe that religious ties supersede individual nations, especially since many of the states in the Arab world were artificially created under the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.

For many fundamentalists, the path to purification begins with their governments. In times of uncertainty or decline, Islamic leaders tend to encourage a degree of fundamentalism, hoping to ward off popular uprisings against the government.<sup>69</sup> Nevertheless, fundamentalists believe that the majority of rulers are not

truly adherent to Islamic principles, and then they often attempt to assassinate or overthrow leaders who do not conform to their beliefs—for example, the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat in 1981. His assassin, Abd al-Salam Faraj, proclaimed “The basis of the existence of imperialism in the lands of Islam is these self-same rulers...There is no doubt that the first battlefield of the jihad is the extirpation of these infidel leaderships and their replacement by a perfect Islamic order.”<sup>70</sup>

Westerners have often speculated upon the root causes of Islamic fundamentalism, and almost all point to the extreme hatred and disdain for the West within the Muslim world as one of the chief motivations for the rise in cultural animosity. Much of the hatred directed by Muslims towards Western culture stems from cultural divisions, such as the failed reformist efforts and a general perception of immorality and materialism within Western society. Equally enraging to the Islamic world is the history of Western imperialism upon Muslim lands, beginning, after the great Muslim conquests, with the Christian Crusades. Indeed, fundamentalists often call upon previous acts of imperialism as justification for modern-day events such as the intifada in Israel.<sup>71</sup>

The first essentially modern act of Western imperialism occurred under the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte, who invaded Egypt in 1798. Since that time, the West has launched a number of wars, occupations, and interventions in the Islamic world, creating a perception among Muslims that Europeans and Americans are constantly attempting to conquer and force their values upon Islamic society.<sup>72</sup> Although Napoleon’s true goal was to establish a base in Suez from which his fleet could attack British ships, he told the people of Egypt that he was there to free them from the oppressive rule of the Mamluks. The Muslim world was shocked that one of its territories could be invaded so easily, and the Egyptian *ulema* despised being ruled by European infidels.<sup>73</sup> Nonetheless, it was the British rather than the Ottomans who defeated the French and returned Egypt’s sovereignty, proving once again that the Europeans were superior in warfare.

Beginning in the 1830s, European powers began occupying Muslim states in Africa, beginning with the French occupation of Algeria in 1830. This was soon followed by Britain and other colonial powers, who captured Aden in 1839, Tunisia in 1881, Egypt in 1882, Sudan in 1889, and finally Libya and Morocco in 1912. Colonialism increased even more rapidly following the defeat of the Ottomans in the World War. European states had desired Ottoman territories for decades, but had feared that intervention in the region would result in its collapse and a subsequent free-for-all among the colonial powers.<sup>74</sup> Because the Ottoman Empire had sided with Germany, however, Europe was presented with an opportunity to divide the region among the victors of the war at the Treaty of Versailles. Under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the former territories “existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.”<sup>75</sup> Such language clearly implied that the European powers were supposed to allow the territories to form independent states once they had formed stable governments; however, the mandates were not actually abolished until after the conclusion of World War II.

Countries within the Arabian Peninsula, such as the Saudi kingdom, held onto their independence mainly because they were principally desert locations and not perceived as worth the effort of conquering.<sup>76</sup> Turkey was the only Ottoman province to avoid the mandate system, for under Kamal Ataturk’s leadership Turkey underwent an extensive reform program designed along Western lines, resulting in a stable multi-party political system, an efficient administrative bureaucracy, and a thriving economy.<sup>77</sup> However, these reforms resulted in Turkey losing a good deal of its own culture and identity, which were replaced by Western ideals and institutions. Ataturk went so far as to abolish the sultanate and the caliphate, regarded as the leaders of all of Sunni Islam.

It was therefore the Mandate System, which was officially created to assist Middle Eastern countries in preparing for inde-

pendent statehood, that resulted in the colonial occupation of Arab states. European countries justified their mandates by focusing on the supposed inferiorities of the occupied states, evoking the notion of the “white man’s burden.”<sup>78</sup> Colonial powers further claimed that they would modernize the political institutions, thereby bringing them closer to the status of a modern state. Despite these claims, European occupation did little for the mandate territories. In addition to damaging the traditional lives and customs of the people, they were often used for the exploitative gathering of raw materials.<sup>79</sup> Overall, colonialism not only hindered modernization efforts through military and commercial domination, but also encouraged autocratic tendencies by repressing the liberties of the people and limiting the expression of opposition to the government.<sup>80</sup>

To this day, the legacy of imperialism leaves a bitter wound in Western-Arab relations, as Middle Easterners have extensive memories of the colonial past.<sup>81</sup> For fundamentalists, it confirms their fears that the West is trying to destroy Islamic values and replace them with immoral Western behavior. Sayyid Qutb, a passionate opponent of British colonialism in Egypt, railed against imperialism, saying, “...the disaster that has truly encompassed Islam has only come in this modern age, when Europe conquered the world and extended the shadow of Crusader imperialism until it covered the whole Islamic world, from east to west. It devoted all its forces to killing the Islamic spirit, drawing its impulse from the inherited Crusader hostility and from the material and cultural strength it bears.”<sup>82</sup>

The greatest challenge to Islamic fundamentalism over the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was the rise of Arab Socialism in the 1960s. Also known as Arab Nationalism, it was most prominent in Egypt under the leadership of President Gamal Abd al-Nasser. For although Egypt attained some independence from Britain in 1922, it was still dominated for many decades by facets of British colonialism, and the inherent failure of the government to implement democracy and reform tainted the notion of Western modernization within the Egyptian populace.<sup>83</sup> Arab Socialism arose in

response to the failures of reform, and its most immediate aim was to achieve complete independence from Britain.

Arab Socialism reached its pinnacle under the leadership of President Nasser, whose movement stood in sharp contrast to fundamentalist ideology. Nasserism rejected the religiosity of Sayyid Qutb and other extremists, and instead blamed Islam for much of the poverty within Egyptian society. Its followers believed that by focusing too greatly on religious principles, Egypt had ignored the scientific and technological innovations that allowed it to be dominated by European powers.<sup>84</sup>

One of the chief objectives of Arab Socialism was to diminish class differences. Therefore, its leaders urged the redistribution of land and wealth, as well as expanded education and social programs designed to help the poor and needy.<sup>85</sup> Under socialist governments, religion was not outlawed, but it was not nearly as influential as in other Islamic nations of the time. Additionally, the government tried to control religious leaders, and many *ulema* became heavily influenced by the bureaucracy.<sup>86</sup> While this tactic was used as a means to exercise control over religious groups, it inadvertently created a platform for new, more conservative religious leaders to voice criticisms of the new government.<sup>87</sup>

Although Arab Socialism was briefly dominant, it eventually failed as a political system. Undermined chiefly by economic failures and governmental corruption, Egypt's staggering defeat in the 1967 war against Israel expedited the process under which socialism collapsed.<sup>88</sup> This led to wide repercussions in the struggle over religious radicalism, as the failure of the Arab Socialist model augmented the influence of fundamentalist ideologies, and nationalist governments became less proficient in combating religious movements.<sup>89</sup>

One of the earliest modern fundamentalist movements of the 20<sup>th</sup> century arose in Egypt, long before the failed attempt to implement Arab Socialism. Known as the Muslim Brotherhood, the group was founded during a period of chaos in 1924 when European colonialism dominated the majority of the Arab World.

The Brotherhood built its base from the urban, lower-middle classes of society, and drew much of their inspiration from the Wahhabi revolution. Their members envisioned a return to the glories of the 7<sup>th</sup> century, and desired a society in which the *Qur'an* would be the guide for all laws and practices.<sup>90</sup> Their message grew quickly and powerfully, and by 1949 there were as many as 2,000 chapters of the Brotherhood, representing as many as 600,000 Muslims. Its leaders advocated “Islamic modernity,” in which the government, religious institutions, and society would be united under the banner of religion.<sup>91</sup> Anti-intellectual in nature, its members believed the West consisted of materialistic, greedy empires bent on colonizing the Arab World.<sup>92</sup> Although ultimately a terrorist organization, the Brotherhood won the hearts and minds of many Egyptians by providing a vast array of social programs, including education, medical care, and trade unions. It also created an organizational system under which observant Muslims came together as “families” in order to conduct religious services and emphasize religious piety.

Although its hatred of the West was great, the Brotherhood despised above all else the “infidels” within their own state, and soon after World War II launched a series of attacks and assassinations against left-wing and nationalist Egyptian leaders. They also worked to “purify” Egyptian society by destroying entertainment complexes and forcing women to adhere to *shari'a*.<sup>93</sup>

The downfall of the Muslim Brotherhood occurred under the reign of President Nasser, who was originally supported by the Brotherhood because they believed that he would wipe out class differences and allow for the creation of one society under *shari'a*. However, it eventually became clear that Nasser’s Arab Socialism was adamantly secular in nature, virulently opposed to the creation of a religious state.<sup>94</sup> The Brotherhood therefore unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Nasser in October 1954, and the government responded with a savage and violent campaign to eradicate the Brotherhood, arresting thousands of its members and purging the army of its sympathizers. The Brotherhood continued to be weakened up to the 1967 war, as the government crackdown continued and Sayyid Qutb was executed. However,

the defeat of Egypt by Israel and the failure of Arab Nationalism kept the Brotherhood alive well into the reign of Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat.

President Sadat came to power in 1970, shortly after the fall of Arab Socialism. A new type of government was needed, and Sadat's aim was to achieve a more free-market, open society, with stronger ties to the West. In 1972, he launched the "Infitah" (Open Door) economic program, which privatized the Egyptian economy.<sup>95</sup> Sadat also tried to establish his legitimacy through Islam, a sharp reversal from the secularism of Nasser's reign, and called himself the "Believer President." However, his attempts to reinvigorate the economy failed, and Sadat soon alienated a significant majority of the Egyptian populace.

One major fault with Sadat's policy was that while it allowed for foreign investment, Egyptians still had few job opportunities, resulting in high rates of poverty and unemployment.<sup>96</sup> Additionally, Sadat's strong ties to the West made it appear as though his reforms were designed only to help foreigners, and his attempts at religious reform also failed, since Islamic fundamentalists regarded him as a hypocrite. Chief among their complaints was that Sadat lived a wealthy lifestyle unfit for a devout Muslim, and also that his government refused to base Egyptian law upon *shari'a*.<sup>97</sup> Furthermore, Sadat did not permit open political expression, and only allowed the existence of Islamic groups as a means to keep leftist revolutionaries at bay. His relationship with the Islamists deteriorated even more rapidly following the signing of the Camp David Accords, in which peace was established between Israel and Egypt. Although the West welcomed the Accords, many in the Arab World believed the agreement capitulated to Israeli demands.<sup>98</sup> Sadat also became increasingly authoritarian in nature, and arrested over 1,500 people in response to criticism of the government. His reign ended when he was assassinated on October 6, 1981, while watching a military parade. His assassin was Khalid Islambuli, a member of Islamic Jihad, who cried, "I am Khalid Islambuli. I have killed Pharaoh and I do not fear death!"<sup>99</sup>

Today, religious candidates continue to do well in Egyptian elections, and the youth are still faced with massive poverty

and unemployment.<sup>100</sup> Since the government has failed to fix the economic faults of the country or provide fair democratic institutions, the conditions necessary for fundamentalist movements are still prevalent, and the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood continues to reverberate throughout Egyptian society.<sup>101</sup>

The greatest triumph of Islamic fundamentalism over the course of the past century was the success of the Iranian Revolution. Although the actual revolution did not occur until 1979, the history behind it began in 1951, during the reign of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq. Under his leadership, the Iranian Parliament nationalized its country's oil, effectively wresting control from British corporations. In response, British and American companies boycotted Iranian oil, and although Mossadeq was for a short time a national hero, the effects of the boycott eventually began to hurt the Iranian economy and damaged him politically. During this period, Britain worked to convince the Americans that a Communist takeover of Iran was possible, thereby playing on Cold War anxieties within the American government.<sup>102</sup> Eventually, President Eisenhower approved Operation Ajax, a plot masterminded by the CIA and MI-6, which resulted in a military coup that overthrew Mossadeq and returned the Shah to a position of absolute authority.

A vast majority of the Iranian people became enraged by events following the coup, during which Mossadeq was sentenced to three years of house arrest and Iran was forced to approve a treaty that re-established oil production by Western international corporations. The overthrow of Mossadeq is perceived in the Muslim world as one of the greatest affronts to Islamic independence by the Western world, particularly the United States. America was seen as hypocritical, for while it preached democracy it aided in overthrowing the elected government of Iran, supported the repressive Shah, and denied the Iranian people their own natural resources.<sup>103</sup>

Following the coup, the Shah was forever seen as a Western puppet, and as he grew more authoritarian in nature, popular resentment increased. To counter fundamentalist forces, the Shah implemented a massive modernization program, based

upon the notion of a Persian nationalist identity rather than a Pan-Islamic Muslim identity.<sup>104</sup> He hoped that by reducing the role of Islam in society, his own power would become stronger as a result. Under the program, he centralized the government and created a new judicial system, under which *shari'a* was not the main influence for the country's laws.<sup>105</sup> Rather than encouraging modernism within Iranian society, the methods with which the Shah tried to impose Western values, including literacy, encouraged the notion that secularization was a brutal notion designed to destroy the Islamic identity of Muslims. As with Egypt under Sadat, the reforms also failed to help the lower classes, thereby creating large social gaps and increasing the poor's resentment of the new government programs.<sup>106</sup>

Iranian society was clearly ready for extreme social upheaval. By 1979, the urban population had risen significantly, encompassing 47% percent of the total. Many Iranians felt as though Western reforms had been implemented too quickly, and that Iran had lost its spiritual essence. Beginning in 1978, police and protesters began to clash continuously, and on January 8, police shot into a crowd of protesters, killing as many as 70 students. Led by the *ulema*, the opposition grew stronger, and was soon joined by the middle class and the trade unions. The Shah was eventually forced to declare martial law, after which the police killed up to 900 people on September 8, 1978. Soon after, the Shah and his family were forced to flee to Egypt, and the Ayatollah Khomeini returned from years of political exile on February 1, 1979.<sup>107</sup>

The impact of the revolution extended far beyond Iran's own borders; for it was the first truly successfully Islamist movement in modern history. As a result, many leaders of Muslim countries increased their emphasis on religious piety, for although the revolution could not have been won without the help of moderates, it was the religious extremists who led the new government. Soon after the revolution, Iranian students stormed the American embassy, holding 52 hostages for 444 days. To many Iranians, it was a symbolic event, for after being dominated for

decades by American imperialism, the Iranians had finally violated Americans' own sovereignty.<sup>108</sup>

In addition to the Muslim Brotherhood and the Iranian Revolution, there have been many significant fundamentalist movements over the course of the previous century. Because each movement is influenced predominantly by conditions within a country, however, it is difficult to provide a set of general guidelines for the actions of all fundamentalist groups. There are, nevertheless, many central principles the majority of fundamentalist groups adhere to, particularly groups who try to achieve their goals through the means of terrorism.

Although all Muslim terrorist groups base justification for their actions upon Islamic doctrine, most tend to be extremely selective in the texts used to justify terrorist action, particularly in the use of "Sword Verses," which are particularly violent in nature.<sup>109</sup> The term *jihad* itself is ambiguous, defined predominantly as one wishes to classify it. It can be interpreted in many ways, including fighting injustice, spreading and defending Islam, or creating a righteous society through teaching, preaching, or war.<sup>110</sup> While the Sunnis historically believe that only the caliph with the support of the *ulema* can declare *jihad*, the Shia believe that all defensive *jihad* is legitimate. Technically, therefore, fundamentalists such as Osama bin Laden do not have the authority to declare a *jihad*. Despite its many complexities, in modern usage the term is often generalized, and has been associated with any armed struggle, specifically those between the House of Islam and the House of War (the House of War consisting of infidels).<sup>111</sup> The act of martyrdom is commended under Islamic doctrine, and martyrs are assured a place in heaven. The *Qur'an*, for example, states that "If you are killed in the cause of God or you die, the forgiveness and mercy of God are better than all that you amass. And if you die or are killed, even so it is to God that you will return."<sup>112</sup>

Although the Western world remained largely ignorant of the fundamentalist resurgence, it was painfully reawakened by the events of September 11, 2001. The chief mastermind of that plan, Osama bin Laden, was influenced almost entirely by the writings

of Sayyid Qutb, demonstrating the wide reach of fundamentalist “intellectuals.”

Bin Laden’s ideology combines Wahhabist revivalist notions with militant principles of jihad, and focuses on the belief that the Muslim world is engaged in a crucial battle against the materialistic West. According to bin Laden, the World has been divided “into two regions—one of faith where there is no hypocrisy and another of infidelity, from which we hope God will protect us.”<sup>113</sup> He is contemptuous of virtually every facet of American culture, especially the separation of church and state, its materialistic tendencies, and the liberation of women, whom, he believes, have been transformed into “consumer products.”<sup>114</sup> According to bin Laden, the war against America and its allies is necessitated by Western action since the end of World War I and its interaction with the Muslim world. In a message dated October 7, 2001, he spoke of the “humiliation and disgrace” that Muslims have suffered “for more than eighty years,” a clear reference to the creation of the artificial states of the former Ottoman Empire after World War I.<sup>115</sup> He furthers this point by saying “What the United States tastes today is a very small thing compared to what we have tasted for tens of years. Our nation has been tasting humiliation and contempt for more than 80 years.”<sup>116</sup> Clearly, the way in which he speaks of “our nation” shows his belief in a Pan-Islamic community, to which all Muslims must subscribe in order to defeat the West. This notion is also stated when he says “America and its allies are massacring us in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, and Iraq. The Muslims have the right to attack America in reprisal... The September 11 attacks were not targeted at women and children. The real targets were America’s icons of military and economic power... They rob us of our wealth and our resources and of our oil. Our religion is under attack. They kill and murder our brothers. They compromise our honor and our dignity and dare we utter a single word of protest against the injustice, we are called terrorists.”<sup>117</sup> Above all, bin Laden’s statements demonstrate that fundamentalists have clear opinions of Western imperialism, and justify their own actions as a necessary response to imperialistic tendencies.

The question that invariably arises upon observing bin Laden's tirades is how the West, particularly the United States, became such a target of hatred by fundamentalist groups. Overall, the most common consensus for bin Laden's ire centers upon acts Western colonialism. However, the causes of frustration directed at the West are far more diverse and complicated.

For example, there is an overwhelming feeling that although progressive Middle Easterners admire Western practices such as democracy, freedom, and human rights, America does not care whether or not these values are obtained in the Muslim world, and that the United States judges the Middle East by lower standards than it would Europe or other developed areas.<sup>118</sup> Many Muslims allege that human rights violations are not frequently challenged, and that regimes with atrocious human rights records such as Libya have been elected to the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations. Indeed, America is often accused of turning a blind eye towards tyrannical regimes, provided they do not interfere with the goals of government policy.<sup>119</sup> This was especially true during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was seen as the far greater enemy, and as a result fundamentalist *mujahedeen* in Afghanistan were funded and supported by the American government.<sup>120</sup> America has also tended to ignore the human rights abuses of friendly regimes, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Overall, this indifference creates an impression that to the West, human rights simply do not matter in the Muslim world.

The United States also has a tarnished record in its support of democracies in the region, particularly when those democracies resulted in the election of religious parties.<sup>121</sup> Indeed, events such as the overthrow of Mossadeq show that America is often only committed to democratic principles benefiting the interests of the United States. The underlying suggestion of these actions is that America does not view Middle Eastern countries as capable of running democracies, and therefore their only concern is whether or not autocratic rulers act in the interest of America.<sup>122</sup>

In addition to its ambivalent stance on human rights and democratic freedoms, the United States is also scorned for its steadfast support of Israel. The Muslim world views the United States as extremely one-sided in negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, and is angered that double standards are applied on issues such as nuclear nonproliferation.<sup>123</sup> American media and public opinion are also perceived as being unfairly biased towards Israel, and uncaring towards the welfare of the Palestinian people.

Islamic fundamentalism has proven to be a tremendously resilient ideology, supported by the rampant poverty and hopelessness faced by the Muslim world. The inability of Islamic societies to counter the resurgence of Christian Europe following the Middle Ages was only the beginning of a history of economic and military domination, and many Muslim nations continue to struggle in the modern globalized economy.

Religious fundamentalism is appealing to the disadvantaged specifically because it is based upon the triumphs of the Islamic empires before their demise. Fundamentalists recruit from the most disillusioned in the Muslim world, thereby suggesting that the ultimate counterweight to fundamentalist ideology is not further military action but rather an economic resurgence. The unlimited potential of the free-market world economy has allowed previously poor and isolated nations such as China and India to prosper economically by employing their driven, educated, young populations, and opening their societies to foreign trade. Such a possibility seems especially out of reach for the Arab world, however, for many of the economies in the region are dominated by oil production. The greatest challenge to Muslim countries that struggle economically, therefore, is whether diversification is a desirable and an attainable goal. Any debate over the economic structure of faltering countries will invariably lend many parallels to the initial arguments over modernization, as many Muslim states possess political and cultural systems that stand in sharp contrast to the developed world. Whether there exists any possible counterbalance to the resurgence of fundamentalist ideology, therefore, remains to be seen.

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> John Obert Voll, Islam, Continuity, and Change in the Modern World (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994) p. 6
- <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11
- <sup>3</sup> John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) p. 122
- <sup>4</sup> Karen Armstrong, The Battle for God (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000) p. 34
- <sup>5</sup> Voll, p. 13
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 105
- <sup>8</sup> Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962) p. 36
- <sup>9</sup> Voll, p. 27
- <sup>10</sup> Hourani, p. 39
- <sup>11</sup> Voll, p. 36
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 86
- <sup>13</sup> Armstrong, p. 44
- <sup>14</sup> Voll, p. 86
- <sup>15</sup> Richard W. Bulliet et al., The Earth and Its Peoples: A Global History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003) p. 770
- <sup>16</sup> Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong?: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) p. 66
- <sup>17</sup> Lewis, Crisis of Islam, p. 66
- <sup>18</sup> Tariq Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads, and Modernity (London: Verso, 2002) p. 63
- <sup>19</sup> Esposito, p. 131
- <sup>20</sup> Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (New York: Modern Library, 2003) p. 159
- <sup>21</sup> Khaled Abou El Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) pp. 3-4
- <sup>22</sup> Rashid Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the Middle East (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004) p.114
- <sup>23</sup> Thomas W. Simmons Jr., Islam in a Globalizing World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003) p. 61
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62
- <sup>25</sup> Abou, p. 13
- <sup>26</sup> Larry Diamond, et al., Islam and Democracy in the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003) p. xiii

- <sup>27</sup> Amir Taheri, Unholy Terror: Islamic Terrorism and the West (London: Century Hutchinson Limited, 1987) p. 20
- <sup>28</sup> Diamond, p. ix
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. x
- <sup>30</sup> Lewis, Crisis of Islam, pp. 114-117
- <sup>31</sup> Simmons, p. 38
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 61
- <sup>33</sup> Lewis, Crisis of Islam, p. 113
- <sup>34</sup> Simmons, p. 25
- <sup>35</sup> Khalidi, p. 103
- <sup>36</sup> Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay (Oneonta: Islamic Publications International, 2002) p. 2
- <sup>37</sup> Voll, p. 55
- <sup>38</sup> Algar, p. 11
- <sup>39</sup> Lewis, Crisis of Islam, p. 122
- <sup>40</sup> Ali, p. 174
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid., p. 75
- <sup>42</sup> Voll, p. 56
- <sup>43</sup> Lewis, Crisis of Islam, p. 123
- <sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 130
- <sup>45</sup> Esposito, Unholy War, p. 48
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 54
- <sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 53
- <sup>48</sup> Armstrong, p. 221
- <sup>49</sup> Taheri, p. 42
- <sup>50</sup> Armstrong, p. 221
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 238
- <sup>52</sup> Esposito, p. 52
- <sup>53</sup> Armstrong, p. 237
- <sup>54</sup> Esposito, p. 61
- <sup>55</sup> Armstrong, p. 240
- <sup>56</sup> Esposito, p. 57
- <sup>57</sup> Lewis, Crisis of Islam, p. 79
- <sup>58</sup> Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002) p. 26
- <sup>59</sup> Sayyid Qutb and William E. Shepard, Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996) p. 2
- <sup>60</sup> Ibid., p. 277
- <sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 297
- <sup>62</sup> Armstrong, p. 243
- <sup>63</sup> Qutb, p. xvii
- <sup>64</sup> Lewis, Crisis of Islam, p. 22

- <sup>65</sup> Esposito, p. 83  
<sup>66</sup> Voll, p. 159  
<sup>67</sup> Taheri, p. 12  
<sup>68</sup> Ibid., p. 22  
<sup>69</sup> Lewis, Crisis of Islam, p. 23  
<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p. 135  
<sup>71</sup> Esposito, p. 73  
<sup>72</sup> Ali, pp. 281-283  
<sup>73</sup> Armstrong, p. 113  
<sup>74</sup> Khalidi, p. 79  
<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p. 21  
<sup>76</sup> Lewis, Crisis of Islam, p. xvi  
<sup>77</sup> Armstrong, p. 191  
<sup>78</sup> Esposito, p. 76  
<sup>79</sup> Armstrong, p. 160  
<sup>80</sup> Lewis, Crisis of Islam, p. 58  
<sup>81</sup> Khalidi, p. 30  
<sup>82</sup> Qutb, p. 282  
<sup>83</sup> Armstrong, p. 192  
<sup>84</sup> Ibid., p. 236  
<sup>85</sup> Simmons, p. 36  
<sup>86</sup> Kepel, p. 52  
<sup>87</sup> Ibid., p. 53  
<sup>88</sup> Esposito, p. 83  
<sup>89</sup> Voll, p. 157  
<sup>90</sup> Kepel, p. 28  
<sup>91</sup> Ibid., p. 28  
<sup>92</sup> Armstrong, p. 223  
<sup>93</sup> Taheri, p. 43  
<sup>94</sup> Armstrong, p. 225  
<sup>95</sup> Ali, p. 126  
<sup>96</sup> Armstrong, p. 289  
<sup>97</sup> Esposito, p. 87  
<sup>98</sup> Ibid., p. 88  
<sup>99</sup> Ibid., p. 90  
<sup>100</sup> Armstrong, p. 339  
<sup>101</sup> Esposito, p. 93  
<sup>102</sup> Ali, p. 134  
<sup>103</sup> Armstrong, p. 231  
<sup>104</sup> Kepel, p. 36  
<sup>105</sup> Armstrong, p. 226  
<sup>106</sup> Ibid., p. 227  
<sup>107</sup> Ibid., p. 306

- <sup>108</sup> Ibid., p. 321  
<sup>109</sup> Lewis, Crisis of Islam, p. 138  
<sup>110</sup> Esposito, p. 28  
<sup>111</sup> Lewis, Crisis of Islam, p. 31  
<sup>112</sup> Esposito, p. 69  
<sup>113</sup> Ibid., p. 21  
<sup>114</sup> Lewis, Crisis of Islam, p. 159  
<sup>115</sup> Ibid., pp. xv-xvi  
<sup>116</sup> Esposito, p. 22  
<sup>117</sup> Ibid., pp. 22-24  
<sup>118</sup> Lewis, Crisis of Islam, p. 104  
<sup>119</sup> Ibid., p. 103  
<sup>120</sup> Khalidi, p. 46  
<sup>121</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) p. 184  
<sup>122</sup> Khalidi, p. 45  
<sup>123</sup> Huntington, p. 184

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