

## AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE COMPROMISE OF 1867

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### Historical Context

A variety of cultures and races lived under the rule of the Habsburgs from their rise to power in 1278 to the empire's eventual dissolution in 1918.<sup>1</sup> For some time since 1848, the Austro-Hungarian empire had been weakening. As a result of internal nationalist fervor it was also facing the prospect of a revolt, one as wide-ranging as the *Springtime of the Peoples*.<sup>2</sup> Nationalists such as Camillo di Cavour and Otto von Bismarck<sup>3</sup> were liberating the Austrian-occupied lands of Italy and Prussia. The threat of empire-wide dissolution was quickly becoming a reality for the Habsburg ruler of Austria, Franz Joseph.<sup>4</sup>

Having no military method with which to suppress the kingdom's internal Hungarian nationalism, Franz Joseph signed a compromise in 1867 with the Magyars,<sup>5</sup> a group of upper middle class bourgeoisie living in Hungary, to pacify their growing dissatisfaction with the *status quo*. The industrial revolution had enabled the Magyars to gain sufficient wealth and prestige in Austria and Hungary during the 1800s, even though one-half of the Magyars in Hungary worked in agriculture.<sup>6</sup> Such an agreement assured Hungary, the area in which the Magyars lived, an equal partner-

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ship with Austria. Other sections of the agreement granted Hungary its own government, as well as autonomous powers within its own parliament that acted mostly without Franz Joseph's consent.

Why did the Austrians defer to the demands of one group of peoples, over those of countless others who also demanded independence (e.g. Slavs, Croats, Serbians, Romanians)? What bearing did this have on the empire? To answer the question, the historiography of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, and the social, economic, and political effects and causes of the Compromise will be examined.

### Historiography

There have been varying historiographical theories concerning the effect of the *Ausgleich*, (the Compromise of 1867) and whether or not it contributed to the demise of the Empire in 1918 and whether the Empire itself had inherent flaws (i.e. too many ethnic nationalities within it).

Among post-World War I historians, Henry Wickham Steed<sup>7</sup> and R.W. Seton-Watson<sup>8</sup> have been adamant that the Empire was doomed to failure. They believed that the failure was a result of the Habsburgs' inability to end Hungarian persecution of the other ethnic groups living in Austria-Hungary. Franz Joseph's Compromise (assurance of increased political power) with the Hungarians was the starting point for this type of persecution. Essentially, both of these historians seek to portray Austria-Hungary as a backward, anachronistic monarchy, unfit to cope with either the growing demands of democracy, or the nationalism within the empire.<sup>9</sup> Oskar Jászi,<sup>10</sup> a Hungarian émigré to the United States, also writes in the same vein as Steed and Seton-Watson. As Beller says in his *Francis Joseph*, "...not only had the Monarchy collapsed under its own internal contradictions, but it had left a very dangerous legacy of over-dependence on bureaucracy and fierce national rivalries."<sup>11</sup> This statement suggests that the Compromise was in itself an unavoidable diplomatic negotiation, and that the empire was pre-disposed to fall.

In the intervening years between the First and Second World Wars, the attitude toward Austria-Hungary was that its inept and ineffective government played a large—if not the only—role in the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The prevailing philosophy was that Austria-Hungary's policies like the *Ausgleich* had hurt, rather than helped, the empire.

The historiographic view did not change drastically until the 1950s, during which the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe led many historians to sympathize with Franz Joseph. They proposed the idea that Austria-Hungary was not moribund, nor were its problems exacerbated by the continued existence of nationalist struggle. Rather, it was the literal act of breaking up Austria-Hungary through the Treaty of Versailles that officially destroyed the empire. In this sense, the *Ausgleich* Compromise of 1867 was not the fatal blow, nor was it even detrimental to the Empire. Historians representing this school of thought like Alan Sked<sup>12</sup> and David Good<sup>13</sup> have continued to shed new light on interpretations favourable to Franz Joseph's government.

From the historiography, two distinct groups emerge—the supporters of the *Ausgleich*, and its disparagers. In retrospect, both seek to explain a much more important question: Was Austria-Hungary predisposed to fail as a result of its government's inability to successfully accommodate its multitude of cultures? Or was the potpourri of nationalities merely one problem, while the Empire's defeat in the Great War was the main factor causing its dissolution?

### The Dualist System and the *Ausgleich*

The purpose of this essay is to investigate whether the Austrian Emperor's decision to allow the Compromise reduced the empire's nationalist dissent and disenfranchisement. Placed against the political discord of nationalist idealists from such groups as the Poles, Slavs, Romanians and given a poor, Magyar-controlled economy, the Dualist system caused much socio-eco-

conomic turmoil in Austria-Hungary from 1867 to 1914. While this Compromise did not bode well for the Austrians, it was the best option that Franz Joseph and his government had. The Habsburgs, in the political climate at the time, had no alternative to this Compromise, in the effort to keep the empire together.

The negative effects of the Dualist system were numerous. However, the root of all its problems lies in the degree of power with which Franz Joseph entrusted a single ethnic faction. The Compromise was undesirable to other minorities for socio-economic reasons. The *Ausgleich*, for the most part, only benefited the Magyars.

The Austro-Prussian War<sup>14</sup> in 1866 did not augur well for Austria; key battles in Koniggratz as well as Sadowa had been lost to Bismarck's far superior armies. At home, Franz Joseph was facing not just a loss, but also the possibility that the upper-class Magyars would choose to sympathize with the advancing Prussians. Unwilling to face this sort of situation, and its ramifications for his reputation on the world stage, Franz Joseph desired most of all to pacify the Magyars. He would give into their demands, at whatever cost.<sup>15</sup> In concert with Magyar lawyer Ferencz Deák, the *Ausgleich* was negotiated, and signed in 1867. The law provided for an autonomous Hungarian government. This agreement meant giving free rein to the Magyars to impose upon Hungary whatsoever they pleased, as well as the power to negotiate more and more concessions from Austria every subsequent decade.<sup>16</sup>

The Dualist system was not beneficial to Austria, Hungary, or its minorities. It helped damage a flagging Austrian economy. The establishment of autonomous economies meant that Austria and Hungary could officially trade with each other, with separate fiscal policies. According to economic historian John Komlos, the overselling of Hungarian state securities to Austria damaged Austria's economy from the late 1870s onwards. With such a large financial investment in the mostly autonomous Hungarian government, Hungarian taxes could be reduced, and private investment could increase, thus strengthening the *Hungarian* economy.<sup>17</sup> In Austria, with funds diverted to the Hungarian economy, any

economic depression would be exacerbated and highly damaging to the Austrians. While Hungarian historians like Pèter Hanák choose to refute this claim by noting that Hungary helped to pay off the Austrian debt every so often,<sup>18</sup> this factual evidence is subject to differing interpretations. With the given distribution of income in Hungary,<sup>19</sup> it is possible that only the affluent Magyars helped pay off the debt, while most other minorities were living in poverty.

Not only did the Dualist system increase economic woes, it failed to take into account the economic plight of the other minorities. This type of neglect led to further domestic turmoil for Franz Joseph. As the economic plight of the minorities contrasted with the wealthy Magyars, (who had cornered the Cisleithanian<sup>20</sup> markets), this led to a disenfranchised group of ethnic minorities. Because the *Ausgleich* ignored the poverty in which the ethnic minorities were living, this compromise did not solve the nationalist problem at the time; it only increased it.

This type of poverty amongst the minorities was contrasted with the Magyars' wealth. By 1867, the distribution of income had become fairly uneven. The economic statistics of such a monopolized economy are evident in Austria-Hungary's unproductive economy: "in 1911, Austria-Hungary produced less than one-sixth as much steel and one-fifth as much coal as her northern neighbour...."<sup>21</sup> This inferiority in production, in a land of vast resources, can only be explained by the formation of Magyar-dominated cartels and monopolies. Railways in 1867 were predominantly Magyar-sponsored. With this type of cartel agreement in place amongst the Magyars, Austria's economy was quite dependent on Hungary.<sup>22</sup>

The Magyars also cornered markets: In "...Transylvania [Romanian territory] for example, only 2.9 per cent of the capital invested in industrial enterprises was Romanian."<sup>23</sup> This type of capitalist influence meant poverty-stricken minorities. In some ways, the abolition of serfdom in 1848 was detrimental to the "peasant bourgeoisie" in that there was little or no land with which to start an enterprise. The Magyars owned 91 percent of all the

significant tracts of land. Although this wealth disparity made business hard, it helped stir up nationalism among other minorities.<sup>24</sup>

This type of economic dominance was already firmly institutionalized by the time Franz Joseph signed the Compromise with the Magyars. With more Magyar autonomy, this meant that the “non-Magyar national movements [would win] support from the masses because class grievances coincided so closely with national oppression.”<sup>25</sup>

The Dualist system also distorted the composition of the Hungarian parliamentary assembly. Magyars now took 90 percent of parliamentary seats<sup>26</sup> in the Hungarian Parliament, despite only comprising slightly less than half the population of Hungary at the time.<sup>27</sup> With such power in parliament, this meant that the Hungarian Magyars held sway over all other minorities, which they treated with disdain. This led to a process called “magyarization,”<sup>28</sup> a shaping of Hungary into the Magyars’ image.

Magyarization included the establishment of laws like the Education Laws, which were intended to boost Magyar influence in Hungary. The Education Law made the “Magyar [language] obligatory in all state and confessional schools....”<sup>29</sup> Moreover, the Magyars forbade any ethnic group to make any sort of attack on another ethnic group.<sup>30</sup> This policy often worked against non-Magyars. For instance, in 1892, Romanian nationalists wrote a letter of grievances to Franz Joseph. This resulted in the nationalists’ imprisonment.<sup>31</sup> From 1898 to 1908, Sked notes that a total of 503 Slovaks were indicted for mistreating the Hungarian flag, while 216 Romanians were also sentenced for the crimes on much the same basis.<sup>32</sup> With the appearance of such oppressive and draconian laws, many Slovaks and Romanians were unwilling to support the Magyars. This situation was not satisfactory for Franz Joseph, who was already trying his best to solve the numerous existing domestic problems.

The wave of nationalism was renewed and stronger than before. First, the Magyars angered many other minority groups, while Franz Joseph set a dangerous example for other alienated

minority groups—with enough negotiation, the non-Magyar nationalists thought that an *Ausgleich* of their own would be possible, a sentiment encouraged by the Emperor himself. Indeed, he ardently supported autonomy for groups like the Czechs, especially after the Compromise. Franz Joseph genuinely attempted to accommodate other groups, as “dynastic interests could no longer ignore national and nationalist concerns....”<sup>33</sup> In a bid to satisfy dejected Czechs who felt excluded by the *Ausgleich*, Franz Joseph tried to grant them their own autonomous lands. Sadly, Gyula Andrassy, the Magyar premier at the time, rejected this suggestion. The Poles in turn sought autonomy in Galicia, while the Croats and Romanians requested lands for themselves in the hope that an *Ausgleich*-type compromise was also possible for them. Evidently, the Compromise created much more nationalist fervor than before, and therefore did not solve the nationality problem in Austria-Hungary.

The agreement between Austria and Hungary not only encouraged more nationalism; it was instrumental in frustrating Franz Joseph’s efforts to pacify all these ethnic minorities. The Dualist system brought Magyar dominance in the Hungarian parliament, *as well as* German dominance to the Austro-Hungarian parliaments. The upper-class Austrian Germans became prominent in the Austrian parliament<sup>34</sup> as a result of the construction of the Dualist system around the *Ausgleich*. The Germans and Magyars had both agreed to support each other in both Austria and Hungary, and thus each gained political prominence from the *Ausgleich*.

Attempts to turn the Dualist system into a federalist multinational state were overturned by the Germans, as well as the Magyars, in Parliament. Count Karl Hohenwart, an Austrian minister in 1871, represented those who favoured a federalist Austro-Hungarian state. That is to say, he supported the equal representation of all nationalities in the Austro-Hungarian parliaments.<sup>35</sup> In a series of proposed laws, Hohenwart (with Franz Joseph in tow) was to grant legislative assemblies to Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia—all non-German lands. This first step toward

federalization was, however, to be nothing more than a quixotic aspiration.

The two main groups against federalization, as mentioned above, were the Germans and the Magyars. A.J.P. Taylor hints at Hohenwart's and Franz Joseph's powerlessness against both groups (but more so the Magyars) in his description of protests and riots following Hohenwart's proposed laws.<sup>36</sup> Count Andrassy, the aforementioned Magyar-Hungarian premier, knew that Franz Joseph was ever fearful of mass revolt: Franz Joseph turned to him for advice, based on the rapport that the two had established during the *Ausgleich* negotiations.<sup>37</sup> Andrassy naturally suggested that the law, which could potentially weaken the Dualist system, be removed, and rejected. Hohenwart's laws, therefore, were subsequently repealed and forgotten. The discouraged Emperor "never again allowed anyone even to question the Dualist system..."<sup>38</sup> Not only did the Dualist system increase national turmoil then, but it also prevented the chance that the question of nationality could ever be solved again.

The new compromise with Hungary did, however, have some positive effects. Franz Joseph would be able to retain special imperial powers. For him, part of the *Ausgleich* meant that he had the opportunity to retain his imperial powers, albeit with slightly less control in some areas. He was officially allowed to veto anything that the liberal parliamentarians agreed to, because of the manner in which the Dualist system was established. Fearing that he would lose all the Habsburg's imperial power, he managed to secure several powers that would preserve his influence.

Franz Joseph's most noteworthy power, perhaps even greater than the support of German and Magyar liberals who supported his power as part of the *Ausgleich* agreement, was the ability to carry a veto in parliament. He could constitutionally resist anything that the Hungarian or Austrian parliaments attempted to legislate.<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, the ability to decide on foreign policy issues meant that the Emperor had more power than a constitutional monarchy normally would be permitted to have.<sup>40</sup>

All these benefits were supposedly designed to solve the nationality question: by gaining extra powers, Franz Joseph would be able to attempt, at least, to push for nationalistic recognition of Austrian provinces. However, he had no real power, for to anger the Magyars meant to lose the integrity of his government. Paradoxically, to adhere to them also meant that he had no distinct power in the first place. Thus, while the extra powers gained from the *Ausgleich* were technically useful, they could never be used, and Franz Joseph was always at the mercy of the Magyars.

In order to see the other nationalities' resultant apathy and disaffection with the Austrian government and the Dualist system, one need only examine the solidarity of Austria-Hungary's army in 1914, the start of the war. Whereas the nationalities of all the provinces of Austria-Hungary fought in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 without noticeable rebellion, the First World War brought unrest from citizens and soldiers of the disenfranchised nationalities. On October 27, 1914, the Bosnian Department of Justice reported that the Serbians in Bosnia had in fact rebelled, showing their support for their Austrian counterparts—the Serbians of Serbia.<sup>41</sup> On August 20<sup>th</sup>, the Czechs, weary of depending on Franz Joseph for their own government in their homeland of Bohemia, offered a constitutional crown to the Tsar of Russia. As well, the Russian military managed to enroll Czech volunteers from prisoners of war for use on the battlefield against the Austro-Hungarians.<sup>42</sup> Not only were the Austro-Hungarian armies composed of disaffected ethnic minorities, but they were also abandoning and betraying the government in Vienna. The situation begs the question: if the Dualist system did not destroy both solidarity, and the socioeconomic situation in Austria-Hungary from 1867 to 1914, what could explain the mass voluntary abandonment of the Austro-Hungarian army?

The historians who prefer to write the Dualist system off as only a diplomatic decision point out that the *Ausgleich* did not cause, either directly or indirectly, any mass revolutions. Yet the lack of potentially disaffected groups who were politically mature was at least equally important.

Therefore, the Compromise of 1867, in some ways, encouraged a certain form of solidarity between ethnic groups—however rudimentary—that allowed for the precipitation of conflict. Primarily of note are the Slavs. As historian John Merriman notes in his book, “in the oncoming age of militant nationalism, the monarchy’s problems would become those of Europe....”<sup>43</sup> Examples of such militant nationalism include, primarily, the Bosnians, and the group called the Black Hand, a collective of Slavic terrorists who helped precipitate total war.<sup>44</sup> In this sense, the *Ausgleich* had provided the metaphorical groundwork for militant nationalism to come: “South Slavs also particularly resented the [*Ausgleich*]...Many Serbs increasingly identified with Russia, which saw itself as the protector of all Slavs...”<sup>45</sup> With Serbians and Austria-Hungarian Slavs being driven into mighty Russia’s open arms, the precipitation of war became inevitable. The defiance of both the Serbian government and Austro-Hungarian Slavs in the face of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum as a result of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand<sup>43</sup> rested mainly on Russia’s declaration of support for them.<sup>47</sup>

It is necessary to note that this Compromise was politically unavoidable. There was serious conflict between Franz Joseph’s absolutist ideals and the newfound nationalistic pride particular to Austro-Hungarian ethnic minorities. Paradoxically, if he chose not to grant any independence to other groups he would not have had an empire to rule by the start of the Great War: the days of Austrian military might were gone. On the other hand, if he chose to grant constitutions to all minority groups, then his government in Vienna would lose influence, and his government would be moot as well. Therefore, to ensure that the empire would not come apart—and appease a prominent cultural group—was a sufficient compromise between these two objectives. Aside from satisfying his absolutist ideals, lack of solidarity among other ethnic groups meant that there was no one to appease with a constitution but the Magyars.

The *Ausgleich* was the culmination of a series of diplomatic mishaps. While Hungarian demands to become independent of

Austria had been vehemently denied at first by Schmerling and Franz Joseph, the negotiations were not over. The Magyar Hungarians were an extremely strong economic force, and were not to be ignored. The new minister of the State in Austria in 1865, Richard Belcredi, assisted in the diplomatic process. It was Belcredi's misconception, Taylor writes, that "it was his duty to make the agreement with Hungary...[and] by giving to all the provinces of the empire the same concessions as Hungary was to receive..."<sup>48</sup> Belcredi also thought that all of the aforementioned agreements with other minorities were merely red herrings and not intended to give any real benefits to the minorities. Belcredi was a Monarchist, first and foremost. His policies were truly meant to help the Emperor maintain the status quo.

To pave the way for the Magyar negotiation, he decided to reverse the current trends of increasing non-Magyar participation in government. He dissolved the Romanian Transylvanian Diet that was supposedly favourable to Austria, and instead packed the Transylvanian assembly with an excess of Magyar liberals.<sup>49</sup> However, the Belcredi government had not realized that the impending war with Prussia intensified Magyar dominance if Austria lost the war against Bismarck. The 1866 Austro-Prussian War saw the Austrians lose battle after battle. After the battle of Konnigratz, and faced with the possibility of a Prussian-Magyar alliance, Franz Joseph agreed formally to iron out the terms of Ferencz Deák's proposals for Hungary.<sup>50</sup> These terms would become the *Ausgleich* Compromise.

Attempting to decrease the significance of Austria's negotiations with the Magyars, Belcredi and Franz Joseph sought to make similar contemporary concessions to other Austro-Hungarians—i.e., to negotiate other treaties with the Romanians, Poles, and Slavs such that—"Hungary should not enjoy a unique position."<sup>51</sup> However, the political climate at the time forced Franz Joseph's government to negotiate, free of ulterior concessions, with the Magyars alone.

One of the most vocal groups that Belcredi was eyeing was the Slavs. Because of their large numbers in the empire (nearly

half the population of Cisleithanian Austria-Hungary at the time<sup>52</sup>), a satisfactory negotiation with the Slavs meant that Hungary's proposal of a constitution and a huge degree of autonomy could be offset by Slavic power.

Nevertheless, the problem with negotiating with the Slavs was primarily that they were not a very cohesive force—the Slavs were a disparate group of peoples,<sup>53</sup> and thus proposing a constitutional monarchy to them would not be very effective.

As for the Austrian Germans, Belcredi found it unfavourable to capitulate to the increasingly liberal Germans. As a result, the sole political allies that Belcredi could muster were the Slavs, and even they had not achieved as much solidarity as the empire's Germans and Magyars had. Even more problematically, the suspension of the Schmerling Patent, a law permitting constitutional expression of other races, was repealed after Belcredi's appointment as minister of the state. With no such law in place, the other minorities were not able to voice their concerns publicly. Their nationalistic complaints could now be legally quelled. Belcredi never managed successfully to see the situation resolved during his tenure, however. He resigned shortly after the Austrian defeat and the end of the Prussian war in 1866.

The Compromise would have been signed regardless of whoever replaced Belcredi. Austria had demonstrated its vulnerability in foreign affairs, and revealed a general lack of alternatives to please the populace. Franz Joseph felt that negotiation with the Magyars was therefore necessary. It is fair to say that to a certain degree, some diplomatic errors—for example, refusing to negotiate with other nationalities before the Austro-Prussian war—contributed to the dissolution of the empire. Yet with each successive mistake that isolated non-Magyars, the severity of the Compromise in favour of the Magyars increased. One could therefore consider it inevitable that the Compromise had to be signed, and the issue of nationality, sadly, became irresolvable.


## Conclusion

The signing of the *Ausgleich* was purportedly used to “stabilize eastern Central Europe....”<sup>54</sup> In fact, the *Ausgleich* did not provide anything of the sort. Keeping in mind that it caused bitter antipathy towards the empire amongst several minorities, the agreement was only successful in that the Empire did not come apart for 50 years after its implementation.

What the *Ausgleich* did was much more subtle—and more malignant—than a revolution. The emasculation of the Austro-Hungarian economy and the consequent strengthening of domestic nationalism are evident from the years after the Compromise’s signing. Although the noble Magyars and the German liberals were satisfied, many other cultures were denied what was given to Hungary, because they were ostensibly not mature and cohesive enough to deserve such autonomy. The final chance at solving nationalist rivalries through the construction of a multinational *federal* state was quickly quashed by the Dualist Magyar supporters. Therefore, not only did the *Ausgleich* intensify nationalist tensions, it prevented any *other* solution to the nationality question.

Revisionist historians like Sked and David Good cite the Austro-Hungarian defeat in World War I as the main factor in the empire’s dissolution. While they believe that Austro-Hungarian stability had been achieved with the *Ausgleich*, it is not entirely clear that this claim can be justified. Slavic and Czech association with Russia, as well as the large number of ethnic minorities going AWOL in World War I did not mean that nationalities were not angered by the *Ausgleich* to begin with. Because these events show Austro-Hungarian disenfranchisement, they must be taken into account when assessing how stable the *Ausgleich* really was. All things considered then, the Dualist system *was* detrimental to the empire in that it intensified nationalism among Austro-Hungarian minorities.

The final debate concerning the inevitability of Austria-Hungary's downfall can thus be approached. The Dualist System was insufficient for, and detrimental to, the numerous cultures dwelling in Austria-Hungary at that time. In the sense that this diplomatic decision was inevitable due to the empire's political climate at the time, Austria-Hungary would have collapsed—with or without the First World War.



## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Margaret L. King, Western Civilization: A Social and Cultural History (New Jersey: Calmann & King Ltd., 2001) p. 543 This empire, at its height of power, contained most of eastern Europe, as well as Italy. The Habsburg dynasty is the Austrian imperial family most well-known for strengthening the empire. The empire was officially dissolved during the Treaty of Versailles in 1918 by those who believed in self-determination for nationalities.

<sup>2</sup> Arthur Haberman, The Making of the Modern Age (Toronto: Gage Education Publishing Company, 1987) p. 123 The *Springtime of the Peoples* occurred in 1848 and was a Europe-wide revolution. This revolt was led by the lower classes to fight for equality and constitutional government.

<sup>3</sup> J.M. Roberts, The Penguin History of the World (Toronto: Penguin Books Canada Ltd., 1992) p. 727 Cavour (1810-61) was an Italian businessman and liberal who became Prime Minister to King Victor Emmanuel of Piedmont. He helped unify Northern Italy through convincing neighbouring areas of Italy to annex themselves to Piedmont, an area in northern Italy. Bismarck was a Prussian prime minister who unified Germany under the rule of King Wilhelm, the Emperor at the time (1871). His expert diplomatic skills are remembered in the term *realpolitik*—politics dictated by national interest.

<sup>4</sup> Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era 1890 to the Present (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2002) p. 84 Franz Joseph was crowned Emperor during the Revolutions of 1848, and served Austria until his death in 1916, in the middle of the First World War. His reign marked the end of Habsburg prominence in Europe.

<sup>5</sup> King, p. 182 These Magyars came in A.D. 899 from the Eurasian steppe, and settled with the Slavs in Eastern Europe. They spoke a language distinctly different from the minorities in Eastern Europe. It is thought to be a Finno-Ugric language

<sup>6</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica “Magyars,” ed. by William and Helen Hemingway Benton (Toronto: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1984) p. 496

<sup>7</sup> H. & C. Seton-Watson, The Making of a New Europe: R.W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary (University of Washington, Seattle 1981) pp. 96-101

<sup>8</sup> Henry Wickham Steed, The Habsburg Monarchy (Fertig New York) pp. 294-295

<sup>9</sup> Steven Beller, Francis Joseph (Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996) p. 4

<sup>10</sup> Oskar Jászi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago University Press, 1929)

<sup>11</sup> Beller, p. 4

<sup>12</sup> Alan Sked, The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire 1815-1918 (Harlow: Longman Group UK Limited, 1989) p. 203

<sup>13</sup> D.F. Good, The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750-1914 (Berkeley: University of California, 1984)

David Good is a revisionist historian who proposed that the union of Austria with Hungary was economically beneficial, and therefore, that the *Ausgleich* was a diplomatically sound gesture.

<sup>14</sup> Haberman, p. 133

This war was provoked by Bismarck over a trivial matter in 1866 in order to conquer several Germanic Austrian regions that Prussia wanted to use to consolidate Germany. The war lasted seven weeks, and was deemed a hugely successful war for Germany and its military proficiency.

<sup>15</sup> John Merriman, A History of Modern Europe: From Renaissance to the Present (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996) p. 784

<sup>16</sup> Anatol Murad, Franz Joseph I and His Empire (USA: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1968) p. 173

<sup>17</sup> Sked, p. 200

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 201

<sup>19</sup> Mason, John W., The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 1867-1918 (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) Longman Publishing Group, 1997, p. 27

This distribution of income is shown by statistics in 1895, that note that 0.16% of all Hungarian landowners—mostly Magyars—owned 33% of the total farming area in the country, whereas 1.25 million peasants only had 6% of cultivated farm area. The 2 million others had no land.

<sup>20</sup> Habsburg Empire was divided in Cisleithania and Transleithania. This area was composed of the western, or Austrian section of the Austro-Hungarian empire.

<sup>21</sup> Mason p. 23

<sup>22</sup> Murad, p. 201

<sup>23</sup> Mason, p. 28

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28

<sup>26</sup> Sked, p. 209

<sup>27</sup> Mason, p. 93

<sup>28</sup> Sked, p. 210

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 209

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 210

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 210

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 211

While Sked notes that there is little evidence of organized revolt to say that Magyarization was extremely detrimental to the government, it must be noted that political maturity for these groups was not far off. Establishments like the Black Hand in Bosnia showed the eventual development of virulent tactics that these organized groups applied to achieve their aims. Violence, in hindsight, would have been inevitable.

<sup>33</sup> Beller, p. 92

<sup>34</sup> Mason, p. 8

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 33

<sup>36</sup> A.J.P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 1815-1918  
London: MacMillan and Co., Limited, 1941, p. 180

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 180

<sup>38</sup> Mason, p. 34

<sup>39</sup> Beller, p. 106

<sup>40</sup> Merriman, p. 462

<sup>41</sup> L. Valliani. *La dissoluzione dell'Austria-Ungheria* (Milano: II Saggiatore, 1966) p. 76

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 82

<sup>43</sup> Merriman, p. 785

<sup>44</sup> Robert Wolfson, Years of Change, European History 1890-1990 (Bristol: Hodder and Stoughton Educational, 2001)  
p. 117

<sup>45</sup> Merriman, p. 785

<sup>46</sup> Wolfson, p. 116

Franz Ferdinand was the heir to the Habsburg throne. During a visit to Bosnia in 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a member of the Black Hand, shot him and his wife to death in a motorcade.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 119

<sup>48</sup> Taylor, p. 136

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 136

<sup>50</sup> Ferenc Deák was a Magyar lawyer who was instrumental, along with Count Andrassy, in propagating the ideal of the Compromise up to 1867. For more information see Bela K. Király, Ferenc Deák (Budapest: Akademiai Kiadu, 1993)

<sup>51</sup> Taylor, p. 141

<sup>52</sup> Mason, pp. 92-93

<sup>53</sup> Taylor, p. 142

<sup>54</sup> Merriman, p. 785

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*The Wall Street Journal*  
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William McGurn, Chief Editorial Writer  
“Review & Outlook”

...So we incline to optimism. In an age when a biography of John Adams can hit the bestseller list and when Warner Bros.—not PBS—is about to release a 3 and 1/2-hour epic on the Civil War (“Gods and Generals”), there’s surely an appetite here. Just look at the impact made by *The Concord Review*, a journal dedicated to publishing essays of high-school students from around the country; more recently the *Review* announced the formation of an organization to encourage students to establish history clubs. At a moment when not a single Ivy League university makes a course in American history a graduation requirement, this is a bottom-up revolution...