

TO WHAT EXTENT DID THE ALLIANCE OF IBN SA'UD
AND THE IKHWAN DURING THE 1920s
LEAD TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF
THEIR RESPECTIVE GOALS?

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Modern Sa'udi Arabia is the result of a unification process undertaken by 'Abd al-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud. To complete this process successfully, Ibn Sa'ud enlisted the support of the Ikhwan, a paramilitary religious movement which combined the fighting ability of the bedouin, the respect for centralized government of the townsmen and the traditional Islamic fanaticism of Wahhabism to create an effective fighting force. This essay will attempt to measure the extent to which Ibn Sa'ud and the Ikhwan achieved their purposes through their alliance. Through a combination of new concepts of warfare and religious fervour, the Sa'udi-Ikhwan force managed to annex, almost entirely, the Arabian peninsula.

Despite the unification of the peninsula under Ibn Sa'ud, the Sa'udi-Ikhwan relationship did not benefit both parties equally. While Ibn Sa'ud achieved his dream of unification—the annexation of the eastern and western coasts of the peninsula and control of Mecca and Medina—the Ikhwan received far less.

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Taught by Ibn Sa'ud to be intolerant and uncompromising towards all other religious doctrines, and to be prepared to die for the expansion of Wahhabism, the Ikhwan launched an unsuccessful rebellion against him when he ordered that their raiding must stop. This failed rebellion marked the last attempted by the Ikhwan to complete their aims, and demonstrated the fact that Ibn Sa'ud benefitted far more from the alliance than they did. Ibn Sa'ud received a kingdom, managing to reconcile religious fervour and modern statesmanship; the Ikhwan won only token gains, and eventually became outdated.

The Arabian Peninsula during the eighteenth century was primitive. Warring tribes of nomadic herdsmen constituted the most prominent section of the population of central Arabia, or "Najd," which was "hemmed in on all sides by the forbidding sand deserts or the rock and lava bed wastes."¹ The region's consequent geographic isolation contributed to its cultural isolation. Lacking the contact with the outside world that the coastal regions enjoyed, the people of Najd were primitive by comparison, for the desert "bred proud, fierce, intolerant men, whose loyalty was not to any distant monarch or emperor but first and foremost to their own tribe."²

Outside Najd, the Ottoman Empire controlled the lands to the north—those called Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq—as well as the eastern and western coastal regions of Arabia, Al Hasa and the Hijaz, respectively.³ To the south and southwest the British completed the circle of foreign power surrounding Najd, controlling what are now the two Yemens, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. Although the Ottoman Empire officially laid claim to it, "the Sublime Porte felt that Najd was best left to the quarrelling tribes"⁴ and concentrated upon the profitable eastern and western coastal regions. The Hijaz, though not directly under Ottoman rule,⁵ prospered from the taxation of Muslims on pilgrimage, or "hajj," to their Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina.⁶ In the eastern region of Al Hasa, which the Turks controlled directly, "wealth was based upon the date palm and the sea."⁷

Ottoman control in Najd was limited to support of the prominent Rashid clan, traditional rivals of the Al Sa'ud clan, who for a long time controlled Najd from their capital of Ha'il, in the north.

Despite the "circle" of foreign power however, and under the questionable bedouin-style control exercised by the Rashids from the north, Najd was wild. Life was spartan. Geographical and cultural isolation, as well as tribal warfare, took their toll. With no effective centralized control, tribal allegiance emerged as the dominant system. Tribal raids, or the "ghazzu," were an accepted way of life. Towns and villages were sparse and rudimentary. As a result of these conditions, Islam, which had once been the guiding force of life in Arabia, fell into lax practice. The Muslims of Arabia, weakened in their study of their religion by the "prevalent illiteracy" which "prevented its study or elaboration"⁸ had reverted to some practices of pre-Islamic paganism, among which were the reverence of sacred trees and offerings to graves.⁹

Against this background of foreign domination, tribal disunity and religious laxity, one man eventually rose to rule a unified peninsula. 'Abd al-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud used the Arabian tradition of Muslim fundamentalism as a military expedient and religious justification during his conquest of Arabia.

As a result of his alliance with fundamental Islam, during the unification process, the modern political and economic roles of Sa'udi Arabia have had to be tempered by the conservatism of reformist Islam, which through this alliance, Ibn Sa'ud himself brought to prominence.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the extent to which Ibn Sa'ud and his fundamentalist Islamic allies benefitted from their relationship during the 1920s and the extent to which Sa'udi Arabia, the modern state, has been affected by it.

Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) founded the Wahhabi¹⁰ movement of Islam. The central ideal of Wahhabism is the “absolute incomparability of God.”¹¹ A native of Najd, 'Abd al-Wahhab, disillusioned with the lax practice of Islam, advocated a return to the fundamental principles enunciated by Muhammad.¹² In his major work, “*al kitab at-tawhid*,” (*The Book of Unity*) 'Abd al-Wahhab condemned such practices as the reverence of sacred trees and offerings to graves as polytheist. Strongly influenced by the strict Hanbali school of Islamic law, the reformer advocated brutal punishments for polytheists and transgressors of what he saw as true Islamic law. He looked to the early era of Islam as the model for spiritual revival and purification, which in its simplicity and directness exemplified the central doctrines of Wahhabi thought—namely the overriding concept of God’s absolute greatness. Briefly stated, the main principles of Wahhabism are:

(1) Allah alone can be worshipped. So central is this principle, that 'Abd al-Wahhab advocated death to those who disobeyed;¹³

(2) knowledge not based on the *Qur'an* or the *Hadith*¹⁴ is illegitimate, hence the fierce Wahhabi resistance to innovation;

(3) life consists of obeying Allah’s law, and the community is the instrument through which to carry out this obedience. Obeying the word of the “Imam” is mandatory.¹⁵ The “Imam” is a religious leader, usually an elder, responsible for leading prayer in the mosque and serving as a community consul or advisor; and

(4) “earthly” pleasures are strictly limited. Music, smoking, abusive language and the shaving of beards are forbidden.¹⁶

In addition to piety and obedience, which are central to Wahhabism, a vehement belief in “jihad,” or holy war, is also an important feature of the sect. To the Wahhabis, “jihad” is not limited to the narrower concept of war,¹⁷ but applies even to domestic measures taken to cleanse or purify or render the community closer to God.¹⁸ Consequently, under Wahhabism, conquest is morally justifiable,¹⁹ a fact which would be very shrewdly cultivated and exploited by the Al Sa'ud clan three times, and

which accounts for the fact that Wahhabism represented the first modern manifestation of militant Islam.²⁰ Around the year 1738, 'Abd al-Wahhab left his birthplace of Uyaynah and resettled in Dar'iyah, whose chieftain was Muhammad ibn Sa'ud and who "accepted his doctrine and undertook its defense and propagation."²¹ Sa'udi-Wahhabi expansion commenced from Dar'iyah in 1747. By 1773, Sa'ud and 'Abd al-Wahhab controlled most of Najd, and in subsequent years continued their expansion in all directions. By 1811, "The Wahhabi empire extended...from Aleppo in the north to the Indian Ocean and from the Persian Gulf and the Iraq frontier in the east to the Red Sea."²² The Ottoman Empire, awakened to the threat of the Wahhabis, eventually crushed the empire. The bond between the Al Sa'ud and Wahhabism, however, had already been established, and a smaller state was to be created again later, only to be crushed by the Rashids.

Following their 1891 defeat at the hands of the Rashids in Riyadh, the Al Sa'ud took refuge in Kuwait. 'Abd al-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud (Ibn Sa'ud) was raised there, as well as in the desert with the Murrah bedouin. Undoubtedly inspired by his family's past glory, Ibn Sa'ud undertook the regaining of past Sa'udi dominions. On January 15th, 1902, at around 20 years of age and accompanied by approximately forty men, he recaptured Riyadh, the old Sa'ud capital, from the Rashid governor. Ibn Sa'ud brought all of Najd under his control by 1913.

It was at this point that he realized that the military force with which he had won Najd would be inadequate for further expanding his influence.²³ The new ruler of Najd lacked a population ideally equipped in terms of occupation, loyalty and ability to accompany him on the long raids that further conquest in the rest of the peninsula would make necessary.

Najd's bedouin and townspeople had certain characteristics necessary in a soldier, but both also had attributes which made their participation in military campaigns either infeasible or risky. The townsmen of Najd had no interest in the free-for-all, institutionalized raiding of the bedouin tribes. "Farmers, merchants,

tradesmen and teachers, they preferred the routine pursuits of their peaceful existence to the sport of battle."²⁴ With the townsman's sedentary lifestyle, trade and farming, came his vested interest in peace and strong, centralized government. Consequently, as towns and village were freed from the Turks by Ibn Sa'ud, they pledged loyalty to him, no doubt seeing him as the one who would satisfy their need for the relative security of centralized control.²⁵ The townspeople of Najd had something to lose, and for this reason they were loyal to whomever could provide them with security.

In contrast, Najd bedouin owned little, and therefore, suffered no great losses through their raiding lifestyle. Their loyalty was transient and dominated by their own personal and material interest. Tribes could be easily bought as allies in a given campaign, or could be easily lured away from their allies with bribes. As bedouin, however, they had some attributes essential to an effective fighting force. They were constantly ready; easily and quickly mobilized; and hardened—used to the spartan conditions of the desert. In addition, with no farms or businesses to tend to, they could be gone for extended periods of time, leaving nothing vulnerable behind. The townspeople, on the other hand, could not easily leave their homes for months on end—farms and trade needed attending, and families could not be left defenseless. Ibn Sa'ud now ruled Najd, but further expansion would require reorganization. In particular, he needed a fighting force that combined the vested interest of the townspeople with the mobility and skill of the bedouin. The need for this townsman–bedouin combination was met by the "Ikhwan." Whether or not there was already an Ikhwan settlement in existence when Ibn Sa'ud undertook the development of the movement is unclear. Some sources credit him with the creation of the Ikhwan as an institution, while others claim that there was already a settlement at "Al Artawiyah," to the south of Riyadh, and that Ibn Sa'ud merely exploited and propagated the idea. Whatever the case, the Ikhwan movement was the ideal solution to Ibn Sa'ud's problem of raising a suitable army. As soldiers, the Ikhwan combined the advantages of both

the sedentary and nomadic populations of Najd, along with one other central factor—the Sa’udi tradition of Wahhabi faith.

The Ikhwan settlements synthesized three aspects of Najd life into one institution. With large subsidies, Ibn Sa’ud lured bedouin away from their nomadic lifestyles and into small settlements called “hijrah” (singular “hujar”). In so doing, he successfully combined the bedouin love of, and ability in, warfare, with the loyalty and vested interest of the townspeople. Ibn Sa’ud instilled Wahhabism in his new converts to sedentary life, since it was the driving force behind the first Sa’udi Empire. Religion was the final and essential ingredient of the Ikhwan movement, and Ibn Sa’ud cultivated it.²⁶ Life in the settlement and religion gave the Ikhwan something to fight for, while their bedouin backgrounds only enforced their eagerness for combat.

Apart from giving the now sedentary bedouin an ideal to fight for, Wahhabism also surmounted tribal differences, thereby alleviating a potential difficulty in raising a large army. The name “Ikhwan,” which in Arabic means “brothers,” was adopted to cement the new religious relationship called for in the “hijrah” which superseded family and tribal ties.²⁷ The Ikhwan had forsaken their past way of life in order to live together in settlements, ready to spread the word of Allah.

Soon after the establishment of the first “hujar,” “hijrah” arose across Najd. There were over 200 such settlements by 1917, scattered all over Najd. None of them was more than a day’s march from another; it was “...an extraordinary military network under Abdul Aziz Ibn Sa’ud’s control...,” probably encompassing some 60,000 men of fighting age in the Ikhwan settlements, at the height of the movement.²⁸ By combining the traits of religious fanatics, townsmen and bedouin, as well as dispersed settlements, the Ikhwan provided the skeleton of Ibn Sa’ud’s forces. Often the forces were supplemented with the people of the Riyadh area, other townsmen and the bedouin of a given area. The battles in the struggle for Al Hasa were quick and decisive, exemplifying the military superiority of a “regular army” over unorganized tribesmen.

This superiority, the discipline of a “regular” army, was what won the Hijaz for Ibn Sa’ud as well. The central battle of his effort to annex the Hijaz was the Battle of Turabah on 26 May, 1919, in which, with a force of 3000 men, the Sa’udi forces defeated the Hashemite army commanded by Sherif Hussayn’s son, ‘Abd allah.

The Hijaz campaign brought Mecca and Medina under Sa’udi control by 1926, giving a greater degree of religious legitimacy to Ibn Sa’ud’s Islamic claims and leadership. Furthermore, it allowed the profitable taxation of pilgrims to the Holy Cities of Islam.

Relatively speaking, the Ikhwan’s annexation of the Hijaz was easy. The confrontations were won quickly and decisively. The martyrdom displayed by the Ikhwan was a new concept of warfare, unheard-of in the days of bedouin fickleness and self-interest. Also a new concept was the massacre of all males in captured camps. A survivor of the Battle of Turabah described the battle this way: “I saw the blood running at Turabah like a river between the palms...I saw the dead piled up in the citadel before I jumped out the window. But the strangest thing I saw was the sight of the Ikhwan during the battle stopping long enough to enter the mosque and pray, then returning to the fray.”²⁹ Children were also slaughtered on occasion, as were women.³⁰ This practice, probably more than any other, struck fear into the hearts of all who found themselves opposed to the Ikhwan. Death in the field may have been sought by the Ikhwan, but it was not a goal shared by their enemies. The practice of martyrdom and massacre created and expanded the Ikhwan’s reputation for ruthlessness, a reputation which was undeniably a major factor in their extraordinary military success.

The Ikhwan, however, cannot be depicted as mere puppets of Ibn Sa’ud. By 1925, they were destroying such modern items as telephone lines. Unsanctioned by the *Qu’ran*, Western technological innovations such as the telephone were thought by the Ikhwan to be the work of the devil. Such actions and beliefs greatly hindered Ibn Sa’ud in his attempts to bring technological

advances to Arabia.³¹ Although relatively minor, these actions demonstrated a growing defiance of Ibn Sa'ud. In 1926, the Ikhwan, through their religious "policing" caused a diplomatic rift with Egypt. Egyptian craftsmen traditionally made the cloth which covers the Ka'aba in Mecca—the "Kiswah." The Ikhwan found the gold-laden cloth idolatrous, and the musical procession which marched alongside offensive. An Ikhwan-induced riot followed, in which many pilgrims were killed. The event typified the spontaneous, defiant violence the Ikhwan were capable of, and had of late indulged in increasingly often.

Following the acquisition of the Hijaz, Ibn Sa'ud controlled the entire peninsula, with the major exceptions of what are now the Yemens and Oman. It was at this point that modern political realities began to confine him. Expansion as he had accomplished it thus far was now unrealistic.

The Ikhwan had won the Holy Cities and gained nothing. Prominent Ikhwan leaders had been denied political authority in Mecca and Medina by Ibn Sa'ud, thereby making impossible any great "purification." "Frustrated and hungry for the plunder denied them in the Hijaz, the Ikhwan began turning their eyes northeast to the traditional victims of Wahhabi fervour, the shrine-worshipping Shia' Muslims of the Iraqi borderlands..."³²

In 1927, raids there became more frequent due to both Ikhwan disenchantment with Ibn Sa'ud and the Hijaz, and the construction by the British of a police post near the Iraqi-Najdi border. Although the Ikhwan managed to destroy the post in December of 1927, the British government, because of the recent discovery of oil in the region, remained committed to guarding Iraq against such raids, going so far as to order the RAF (Royal Air Force) to pursue the raiders back into the Najd.³³ Ibn Sa'ud understood the realities of foreign relations and realized the danger of allowing the raids into Iraq to continue. He faced a dilemma, however. He could not continue to aggravate his worsening relations with the British in Iraq, nor could he simply and effectively stop the Ikhwan. "Having incited them to suspect and hate every non-Wahhabi as an agent of the devil, he could not now

plead the merits of compromise with the infidel British—and since he had elevated the murderous innocents to the principal element in his armed forces, he could now pursue his disagreements with them only at the risk of his own destruction.”³⁴

The problem did not end with the raids into Iraq; raiding and murder occurred within Arabia itself. The Ikhwan were rebelling against sedentary government and the lifestyle it entails. The Ikhwan wanted to dwell forever in the days of raiding and infidel elimination. They were fanatics, and their fanaticism now had nothing to be directed against. Given no targets, they chose their own, merely taking the teachings of their leader to their logical conclusion. Ibn Sa’ud failed to create a settled sedentary Wahhabi fighting force. Wahhabi fanaticism had been instilled in them, but at heart, the Ikhwan were still bedouin. They now wanted to practice the rites of their religion in a way which allowed them to satisfy their bedouin instincts. The development of the Ikhwan transformed many tribes, each with its own allegiances, into one, unified in allegiance to Wahhabism. They wanted to be free from central control, to be free bedouin again, but now for religious expansion.

To this end, the Ikhwan Rebellion took place. Persisting in their violent defiance of authority, a splinter group of Ikhwan became nothing less than rebels. Ibn Sa’ud realized that the situation could not be solved peacefully, and, ironically, employed the very Western technology they had so much disdain for. In addition, Ibn Sa’ud cajoled uncommitted bedouin with money into joining an army that ultimately outnumbered the rebels.

The critical battle of the Ikhwan Rebellion, the Battle of Sabillah of March 1929, was over in half an hour. Following his victory, Ibn Sa’ud departed for the Hijaz, certain that the Ikhwan trouble was at an end. He was wrong, however, for due to a misunderstanding between representatives of the Ikhwan and Saudi camps, the conflict was reignited, and the rebellion was taken up again. The second uprising, like the first, was put down quickly.

Following their second defeat, the Ikhwan were no longer a major force in Arabia. Their destruction, by their creator, heralded the end of Ibn Sa'ud's conquests. As Lacey puts it: "Abdul Aziz's destruction of his holy warriors had been the token that his great era of expansion was drawing to a close, and it also acknowledged that his rule and power in the future would not be based on bedouin fanaticism..."³⁵ The Ikhwan heyday as the feared right hand of 'Abd al-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud was over.

Like all alliances, the Sa'udi-Ikhwan alliance was expedient while both parties benefitted. It also had the added advantage of being extremely effective in attaining its goals. Dogmatic Islamic fanaticism was fine, as long as it had a target to be directed against. When the realities of 20th century international relations confronted medieval religious expansion, it was Ibn Sa'ud who was able to make the adjustment.

The ability to adjust, however, was lacking in the Ikhwan because of the doctrines which Ibn Sa'ud had fostered and instilled in them. In this sense, the Ikhwan were the scapegoats of Ibn Sa'ud and his unification process. The new ruler of the Kingdom of Sa'udi Arabia, declared in 1932, owed his centralized power in a united peninsula to the Ikhwan's ability to inspire terror and their dedication to expansion. Confined now by an absence of adversaries in the peninsula, and by the British in Transjordan and Iraq, Ibn Sa'ud had no more use for the Ikhwan and went against what he had taught them—the elimination of Western infidels and the universality of Islam. Their indignation at being betrayed by a trusted leader is understandable, and their consequent rebellion highly justifiable. The uncompromising narrow-mindedness Ibn Sa'ud had developed and exploited in the Ikhwan was now the source of their dissent, and hence he must bear the lion's share of the responsibility for their rebellion.

What the Ikhwan gained from their alliance with the Al Sa'ud is much harder to quantify as well as qualify. Certainly for a brief period they enjoyed a position of religious and military superiority in Arabia. They dictated the moral and religious code of the land as well as being a major political influence through

their special relationship with Ibn Sa'ud. Their prominence during that brief period is clearly shown by the fact that it was they who held together what had traditionally been a patchwork of desert tribes.

These accomplishments, however, have little to do with the actual aims of the Ikhwan. Their faith was simple and overriding, and accordingly, their aims were also simple when viewed in contrast to Ibn Sa'ud's twentieth century aspirations. The Ikhwan wanted to expand their doctrine through conquest; at heart, they remained bedouin, and longed to indulge their religious beliefs through bedouin methods.


No matter how simple, the Ikhwan did not achieve their aims to the point they desired. Certainly control of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina could be a great consolation to any Muslim movement, but the Ikhwan were excluded from the administration, religious or otherwise, of the Holy Cities. Ibn Sa'ud turned on them and we can sympathize more with Ibn Sa'ud, for, in terms of statesmanship and religion, he was closer to Western culture than the Ikhwan. To the Ikhwan, Ibn Sa'ud was a puppeteer who used them only as long as they were useful to him, and eventually contradicted the doctrines he had once encouraged. As far as their expansionist aims are concerned, the Ikhwan were successful conquering to the border of the Arabian Peninsula; this is a small success, however, when the intention was to convert the world to Wahhabism.

The most important gain for the Ikhwan, although fairly abstract, is the effect they have had on Sa'udi society. Sa'udi Arabia remains today one of the most conservatively Islamic nations in the world. This religious conservatism can be traced back to the legitimacy in religious doctrinal issues the Ikhwan enjoyed through their privileged relationship with the founder of Sa'udi Arabia. Their influence in modern Sa'udi theology is, in religious terms, a major gain for the Ikhwan, resulting from the Sa'udi—Ikhwan alliance in the 1920s.

Despite the fact that Sa'udi rulers since Ibn Sa'ud have been faced with the difficult task of satisfying both modern

political and reactionary Islamic demands, the very existence of a separate and distinct Sa'udi nation and society is a product of the Ikhwan's military and religious contribution. The Ikhwan have, in a sense, set the pace of progress in Sa'udi Arabia, ensuring that it must always be tempered by Wahhabi doctrine. This feature in Sa'udi political development is maintained in a ruling class comprised of the Sa'ud family, selectively intermarried with that of 'Abd al Wahhab.

Furthermore, it would be a mistake to assume that the Ikhwan had an effect only in Arabia. They set the precedent for a viable combination of modern statehood and Islam, a precedent whose importance was heightened by the fact that it occurred during a period of intense Arab nationalism. Despite the trappings of reconciling modern statehood and Wahhabism, the national identity it has given Sa'udi Arabia is an important aspect of the Ikhwan's effect on that nation, albeit a difficult one to quantify.



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¹ J. S. Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1978) p. 8

² Mohammed Almana, Arabia Unified: A Portrait of Ibn Sa'ud (London: Hutchinson and Benham, 1980) p. 23

³ Robert Lacey, The Kingdom (London: Fontana–Collins, 1981) p. 75

⁴ Habib, p. 11

⁵ The Ottomans controlled Hijaz through the Hashemite family, most notably Sherit Hussayn, who, according to Almana, “was in reality little more than a Turkish puppet.” Almana, p. 21

⁶ Almana, p. 23

⁷ Lacey, p. 107

⁸ J. B. Glubb, War in the Desert (n.p., n.d.)

⁹ H. A. R. Gibb, and J. H. Kramer, eds. Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1953) p. 619

¹⁰ “Wahhabi” is the Western name for the followers of 'Abd al-Wahhab's doctrines. Wahhabis themselves do not like the name because it implies that they revere 'Abd al-Wahhab—a great sin to them. They prefer the name “al-Muwahiddun,” “the Unitarians,” which emphasizes their belief in the “oneness” of God.

¹¹ R. Bayly Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century (London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1965) p. 9

¹² Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 12, p. 451

¹³ Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, p. 618

¹⁴ The *Hadith* is comprised of the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad.

¹⁵ Winder, pp. 10–11

¹⁶ Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, p. 618

¹⁷ Winder, p. 11

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 11

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 11

²⁰ G. H. Jansen Militant Islam (London: Pan Books, Ltd., 1979) p. 87

²¹ Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, p. 618

²² H. St. J. Philby in Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, p. 619

²³ Habib, p. 15

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 15

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 15

²⁶ Almana, p. 81

²⁷ Habib, n.p.

- ²⁸ Lacey, p. 146
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 150
- ³⁰ Habib, p. 66
- ³¹ *Almana*, p. 83
- ³² Lacey, p. 204
- ³³ *Almana*, p. 89
- ³⁴ Lacey, p. 207
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 210–211