

THE ROLE OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK RADIO  
IN THE FIRST WEEK OF THE SOVIET OCCUPATION,  
FROM AUGUST 21 TO AUGUST 27, 1968

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Abstract

The aim of this essay is to determine the role of the Czechoslovak Radio during the first week of the Soviet occupation, from August 21 to August 27, 1968. More precisely, what were the functions played by the radio during the first week of the occupation, and how did the radio influence the outcome of the Moscow negotiations? It should be noted that throughout the essay, the term "Soviet" also includes, for the sake of brevity, all other countries which occupied Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The essay first examines the events of the Prague Spring of 1968, beginning with Dubcek's ascension to the post of Party First Secretary, the introduction of the Action Program and the issuing of Soviet warnings culminating in occupation. In order to establish the limits of influence of the radio, the scope of its audience is then examined. Next, the essay determines the various roles of the radio from August 21 to August 27, 1968, and ultimately

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discusses the importance of the radio in influencing Soviet decisions about the government of Czechoslovakia.

The essay ends with the conclusion that the Czechoslovak Radio played a central role in the August crisis, assuming functions usually carried out by government, especially directing public resistance. Through these functions, it significantly helped in reducing the success of the political plans of the USSR for Czechoslovakia. Specifically, the Soviet Union was confronted with international protests demanding a rapid solution to the situation, and re-installed the reformist government of Czechoslovakia. Some months of diminishing freedom then passed before the process of “normalisation” was fully operational.

Mostly primary sources were examined, especially books published within a year of the crisis. Interviews with those who experienced the events were also carried out in order to gain a personal perspective of the events.

## Introduction

At 7:35 am on August 21, 1968, Prague Radio reported that occupation troops were nearing the radio building while firing tracer bullets and live ammunition: “Several hundred people are trying to stop the advancing tanks with their bodies. The radio building has been hit by dozens of shots and is being buzzed by aircraft of the Antonov type and by large fighter planes. Czechoslovak Radio asks the people to try and engage the troops in conversations—it is our only weapon.”<sup>1</sup>

This was the beginning of an unusual episode in the history of radio broadcasting. Perhaps for the first time, the radio played a crucial role in guiding the resistance to the occupation of a country, and in decisively influencing the fate of that country through its leadership of the population.

The investigation of the roles and overall importance of the radio in the first week of the occupation of 1968 leads to a

recognition of the significance that modern means of communication can have in influencing the events within a country.

## Background

On January 5, 1968, Czechoslovak Communist Party secretary Antonin Novotny was replaced by Alexander Dubcek, and Ludvik Svoboda replaced Novotny as president of Czechoslovakia on March 30, 1968. The new party program, called the "Action Program," was published on April 9, 1968. It embodied a radical shift in the Party line, containing far-reaching reforms aimed towards the "humanization" of Marxism. This program was henceforth steadily adhered to, leading to increasing freedom in Czechoslovakia.<sup>2</sup>

Thousands filled Old Town Square in Prague on May 3, 1968, for an authorized gathering that developed into an anti-Communist demonstration. Six days later, the Western world registered massive Soviet troop motion towards the Czechoslovak border, and it seemed an invasion of Czechoslovakia had begun. Radio Prague addressed all friends of Czechoslovakia, entreating them to prevent a repetition of Yugoslavia or of the 1956 Soviet intervention in Hungary.<sup>3</sup> The next day, the Czechoslovak government belittled the crisis, claiming advance knowledge of the maneuvers. However, a major Soviet warning against excessive, rapid reforms had clearly been issued.

At the end of May, foreign troops began arriving inside Czechoslovakia for maneuvers, eventually numbering tens of thousands, and providing a military presence in Czechoslovakia until their belated withdrawal on August 3, 1968. These further exemplified Soviet discontent with Czechoslovak events.

The Czechoslovak government consistently dismissed Soviet warnings, however, earning it vast popularity.<sup>4</sup> On June 26, reforms continued with the abolition of censorship. Immediately, a "2000-words" manifesto was published by several leading intellectuals, warning against a relapse into authoritarianism. It caused

a deeply hostile response in the Soviet Union, where it was labelled a clear call for counterrevolution. The Czechoslovak government denounced the manifesto after contact with the USSR, but little was done to curb further expressions of this kind.<sup>5</sup>

Throughout July, Czechoslovak-Soviet tension intensified. On July 14, 1968, the USSR and its allies, excluding Czechoslovakia, met in Warsaw. The result was an ultimatum sent to Czechoslovakia, demanding what amounted to a rapid return to pre-January conditions, and indicating that Czechoslovakia was “responsible...to...the world Communist movement,” and therefore not wholly autonomous in dealing with its affairs.<sup>6</sup> The Czechoslovak government did not comply with the conditions of the ultimatum. On July 29, the entire Soviet Politburo met with the Czechoslovak Presidium in Cierna, in Slovakia. Soon afterwards, on August 3, 1968, the five nations that had issued the ultimatum in July met with Czechoslovak representatives in Bratislava. The Soviets later claimed that at Cierna and Bratislava, Czechoslovakia accepted secret directives which it subsequently betrayed, necessitating an invasion. However, the Czechoslovak government at the time denied any secret agreements, and President Svoboda publicly announced that the nation “shall not depart from the path on which we have set out.”<sup>7</sup>

Accordingly, although the pace of liberalization slowed noticeably in August, no restrictions were imposed on existing freedoms. The Soviet Union and its allies nevertheless eased their attacks on Czechoslovak reforms, and a period of relative calm ensued in the second part of August.

However, on August 20, 1968, Czechoslovakia was unexpectedly invaded and occupied by troops from the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, East Germany and Bulgaria.

Important Czechoslovak party and government officials, including Dubcek, Smrkovsky and Cizar were rapidly arrested and either taken to undisclosed locations or placed under house arrest.

The Czechoslovak population reacted to the invasion with immediate and almost unanimous hostility, which expressed itself

especially in the spontaneous nonviolent resistance that occurred throughout the country.<sup>8</sup> The resistance was to a large extent encouraged and organized through the Czechoslovak radio network.

The Czechoslovak Radio was taken by the invading soldiers on August 21, 1968. However, based on a Soviet suggestion made some years previously, an underground radio network had been set up in Czechoslovakia in preparation for a possible invasion from West Germany. Using this network, Czechoslovak Radio was able to continue broadcasting from secret locations, and to play a central role in the first week of the invasion.

### Widespread Audience

Nearly everyone listened to the radio throughout the week of August 21 to August 27, 1968.<sup>9</sup> In the tense situation, which changed from minute to minute, the radio was often the only source of instant information. At many factories in Czechoslovakia, workers designated someone to continuously listen to the radio, and at various other workplaces, “the legal” Czechoslovak stations... [were]...fed into the public-address system”<sup>10</sup> to enable continuous listening. [“legal” refers to radio stations that were, in fact, considered “illegal” by the USSR and its Allies at the time] (i.e. the Czechoslovak Radio and its regional branches). Throughout the first week of the invasion, the vast majority of Czechoslovak institutions, organizations and citizens emphasized the word “legal” when speaking of these stations, stressing Czechoslovak autonomy in the face of Soviet invasion.] According to one eye-witness account in the National Assembly building, “transistor radios [could] be heard at all times.”<sup>11</sup> In Moscow, *Pravda* reported on August 23 that “cars with loudspeakers transmitting illegal radio broadcasts have appeared in the streets.”<sup>12</sup> And Joseph Wechsberg describes a typical scene: “At the street corner... a group of people were listening to a transistor radio.”<sup>13</sup>

Besides the radio, the television also went underground to continue broadcasting. However, the radio continued to be a

primary source of information, not only because it broadcast continuously from all parts of the country on up to twelve stations, while the television had at most three and did not provide continuous coverage, but because transistor radios were more widespread among the population<sup>14</sup> and easier to carry than television sets.

Although many newspapers continued publishing illegal editions after their offices had been occupied by the invaders, the chief source of their information was the radio. The papers relayed the instructions of the free radio network, and published long speeches which had been broadcast earlier. In a continuously evolving situation, they were not used as sources of immediate information but rather for analyses of the previous day's events.

### Substitute Government

Joseph Wechsberg writes that although initially the radio was only giving moral support, it soon began directing resistance activities, and finally "running a country that had no government for a whole week."<sup>15</sup> Indeed, after the arrest of key Czechoslovak leaders and their subsequent removal to Moscow for negotiations, a void developed in the administration of the country. The weakened government, which had virtually no contact with its top officials, failed to establish solid contact with the population and to manage effectively. Meanwhile, the clandestine radio network, calling itself the "free, legitimate radio,"<sup>16</sup> continued to function without Soviet censorship. Thus, it soon naturally assumed the role of directing daily affairs within the country. It continued in this role until the government resumed its normal functioning with the return of the Moscow delegation of top officials on August 27, 1968.

The radio's unusual role within the newly occupied country manifested itself in several ways. Invariably, the primary role of the radio was to inform the public and to prevent panic. It continuously broadcast reports of the situation in all parts of the republic, and issued citywide status reports and traffic reports. It updated citizens about the progress of the invaders as they moved

through the country, named the institutions they captured, and described the scenes where clashes occurred. It broadcast the little that was known about the conditions and whereabouts of Czechoslovakia's leaders. It informed the public that although "enough food is available...in order to prevent a panic, rationing is going into effect."<sup>17</sup> The radio also continuously appealed to citizens to "keep calm. Let your weapon be passive resistance. Don't be provoked,"<sup>18</sup> and warned against provocateurs.

The radio informed people of the extent of the resistance to the occupation, and prevented collaboration. Regularly, the radio broadcast condemnations of the invasion from various establishments and assemblies, from private citizens, and from government leaders. Known collaborators were named on the air, warnings against collaborators were issued, and the success of Czechoslovaks in refusing to collaborate was celebrated. On August 21, the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences went on the air to announce that "The occupiers...have failed to install a collaborationist regime,"<sup>19</sup> and the next day, the radio declared that "the only response to...traitors [is] the contempt of the nation and the refusal to have anything to do with them."<sup>20</sup> On August 22, Brno radio announced that a traitor had given the address of their studio to the Soviets. It provided a precise description of the man. The announcer then continued that "'Soviets have just entered the back yard,' One heard cries of 'shame!'"<sup>21</sup> The angry motto "Kolder-Indra-Bilak-Svestka," composed of the names of well-known collaborators, was widely repeated, and the families of Kolder and Indra withdrew to the Soviet embassy.

The Czechoslovak radio enabled citizens to remain informed about the outside world, as well as demonstrating to the outside world the real situation in Czechoslovakia. It informed its listeners about the Czechoslovak appeals to the United Nations, and that a large part of the world, both Communists and non-Communists, was infuriated by the invasion. Whereas the Soviet Union claimed that it had been summoned into the country by unnamed government officials, the Czechoslovak radio, broadcasting in up to eight languages, continuously demonstrated the falseness of this to the outside world with its government broad-

casts. These included the August 22 declaration of the National Assembly reaffirming its loyalty to the legal Government,<sup>22</sup> and the proclamation of the Extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress, which stated that “no competent Party or constitutional authority has requested such an intervention.”<sup>23</sup>

The organization of resistance took place largely through the radio. On the morning of August 21, the radio broadcast an appeal from the creative artists’ unions for a two-minute protest strike against the invasion at noon.<sup>24</sup> The strike was carried out successfully, and on the next two days was lengthened to one-hour strikes. On August 23, the radio warned that there would probably be arrests during the night, and asked the population to remove all street signs, highway direction signs, house numbers and name plates throughout the country. This became one of the most extraordinary demonstrations of non-violent resistance in Czechoslovakia. The newspaper *Lidova Democracie*, on August 24, describes the effect: “After the legal radio...appealed to them yesterday...hundreds of thousands of people destroyed corner street signs and number plates on houses...even name plates of apartment residents.”<sup>25</sup> In effect, the only signs left in Prague were ones pointing to Moscow.

Among other things, the radio also asked people to make signs and posters in Cyrillic telling the Russians to go home, and broadcast numbers of licence plates whose cars were to be stopped because they were used by Russian police to arrest Czechoslovak citizens. The radio asked its listeners to hold up their transistor radios to the Soviet soldiers while they broadcast in Russian, telling the soldiers to leave, and directed people to destroy phone books in public booths so the occupiers could not easily determine anyone’s address.

Due largely to the radio, the government was able to continue communicating with its citizens. The radio began its broadcasting on August 21 with a declaration from the Presidium of the Central Committee condemning the occupation, and continued broadcasting interviews, speeches, and resolutions from members of the government regularly. Hearing the government

so solidly condemning the invasion, asking for calm and order and giving advice, had a calming and unifying effect on many in the population.<sup>26</sup> It also assured many people that the government was still functioning and prevented panic. As the Institute of History at Charles University noted, the government “succeeded, with the aid of the means of communication, in maintaining a relative calm in the country.”<sup>27</sup>

The radio also maintained “the unity of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and government,”<sup>28</sup> and allowed it to organize under difficult conditions. One of the most outstanding accomplishments of Czechoslovak unity and resistance during the first week of the invasion was the meeting of the Extraordinary Fourteenth Communist Party Congress on August 22, 1968. The arrangements for the Congress were made largely through the radio, which not only announced that the Congress would convene and asked all members to go quickly to Prague, but also instructed delegates to avoid unsafe meeting places and told them where to go instead. The resolutions passed by the Congress were then broadcast over the radio.

The Congress, secretly held in a factory, was a shining symbol of national resistance, and strengthened general morale. On August 22, thousands of people followed the instructions of the radio and stood with signs or wrote posters telling the delegates how to proceed to their destination. This enactment of mass, visible defiance in the midst of foreign occupation had an “immediate unifying effect”<sup>29</sup> upon many citizens. It was also a loud message to the rest of the world of Czechoslovak resistance. Yet without the radio, the party may indeed not have been able to organize itself at all, and certainly not so rapidly.

Often, citizens were warned of danger over the radio, and the rapid transmission of important messages was made possible. From the emergency broadcasts of “motorists, stay away from the road to Svinov...Soviet soldiers...shoot at every vehicle”<sup>30</sup> broadcast by Ostrava, to Prague’s warning for a colonel in the Czechoslovak army “not to come home”<sup>31</sup> for fear of arrest, the radio continued instructing citizens on how to stay safe. It also provided

an alternative means of communication, and from time to time small messages would appear, such as “Jane in Prague, the light went out,”<sup>32</sup> or “Jiri, report back, Milada.”<sup>33</sup> The nation was thus kept interconnected.

The radio provided a constant, visible show of resistance to the occupation. Many people listened to the Soviet occupation of the radio building on August 21, and an eye-witness recalls “the shaking voice: ‘Friends...I think these will soon be the last words you will hear from us. Friends, we all believe, I ask you urgently, believe that healthy thinking must win...you hear the shooting...’”<sup>34</sup> When people listened to the radio, they were aware that at any moment, those broadcasting were risking even their lives, and could easily be arrested. There were sudden emergencies, such as when on August 23, Prague Radio abruptly went off the air after sudden loud shouts and stomping of boots was heard, and the other stations urgently broadcast their calls, which were eventually answered, probably from another studio.<sup>35</sup> The courage of the announcers was an ever-present reminder that defiance was alive, and served as an example for all to follow.

One of the most important roles the radio performed during the first week of the occupation was the unifying effect it had upon the nation at that critical time. There is probably a tendency for any group of people, when placed under pressure, to become more unified. This tendency was apparent in the spontaneous mass resistance on August 21. However, the radio gave order to the unity<sup>36</sup> and “was...essential for...[the]...morale”<sup>37</sup> of the population. Constantine Menges writes that the mere existence of the resistance radio “in spite of frenetic efforts to find and destroy them...[had]...a major impact on morale and on the political cohesion of the Czech party and bureaucracies.”<sup>38</sup> The stations never stopped transmitting unless a studio was in immediate danger of discovery, and the sole topic they dealt with was the occupation and its effects on the population. The number of radio stations operating in Czechoslovakia increased greatly during the invasion, from two before the invasion to an average of ten from August 21 to August 27. Each station constantly reminded its listeners of the unity that was necessary in the face of the enemy,

and, for the first time, called its listeners “friends,” rather than “comrades.” The motto of the radio became a widely popular slogan of the resistance: “We are with you, be with us.”<sup>39</sup> On August 23, the National Assembly issued a proclamation in which it acknowledged to the radio that “Thanks to you, a mighty patriotic movement is spreading...our determination to resist occupation and to face...the traps laid by traitors...is getting a firm hold.”<sup>40</sup>

### Exposure of the Limits of Soviet Power

It may be said that an indirect role of the underground Czechoslovak radio was the public humiliation of the invaders and the exposure of their weaknesses, which in turn pointed to their failure. In a sense, the radio became the embodiment of Czechoslovak resistance, and proved its success against the half a million foreign soldiers in the country. Czechoslovak unity and morale were uplifted by the public exposure of Soviet failure to deal effectively with the radio network, and the high morale and continuous defiance in turn produced key concessions from the Soviet Union.<sup>41</sup>

The USSR and its allies were completely unprepared for the establishment of a clandestine radio network. They had counted on the Czechoslovak secret police to interrupt radio broadcasting in the initial hours of the invasion. When the police refused, the Soviets belatedly tried to shut down the Czechoslovak Radio themselves. Although they finally accomplished this, the radio soon began broadcasting from secret locations, mocking their attempt.

The invaders set up their own radio station, masking it as a Czechoslovak one. “Radio Vltava,” as it was called, backfired terribly, due largely to the fact that the announcers spoke such broken Czech and Slovak. The clandestine radio ridiculed it, calling it “Radio Volga,”<sup>42</sup> and when the occupiers tried to play it over the public address system on Wenceslas Square, they had to stop after several attempts because of the loud whistling that occurred each time. Their failure was very public.

During the first few days, the Soviets seemed to rely mainly on collaborators to tip them off about the location of the studios. This did not happen very often, and although a couple of stations were taken off the air, the rest continued broadcasting in a continual scorn of the invasion. Czechoslovaks thus wondered at “this...most peculiar occupation in history,”<sup>43</sup> and morale was raised when they noted that “the moral victory is ours...the aggressors have encountered such single-minded resistance...that there is no precedent for it in history...they have seized the radio, but the broadcasts go on in freedom.”<sup>44</sup> When, finally, a train arrived from Moscow carrying radio locating equipment, it was held up for days by Czechoslovak railway men using various excuses. In the end, the equipment had to be lifted to Prague by helicopter. This incident was reported on the radio, as well as on television and in the press, and provided proof of the continuing solidarity of the population.<sup>45</sup>

The Soviet “failure to provide anything resembling a convincing legal or political justification”<sup>46</sup> for the invasion was demonstrated to the whole world through the unity of the Czechoslovak people in their opposition, which was largely maintained and evidenced by the radio.<sup>47</sup> Indeed, the Czechoslovak “solidarity...[was]...such that many were later to call it the most exhilarating if tragic week of their lives.”<sup>48</sup> Clearly seeing the undisguised aggression and injustice the USSR was committing upon a peaceful population, much of the world condemned the invasion. Never before had the Soviet Union stood so alone—even Communist Parties all over the world declared their disapproval,<sup>49</sup> with China calling the invasion a “shameless act.”<sup>50</sup> Even Fidel Castro, who approved of the invasion, admitted that it was a “‘flagrant’ violation of Czechoslovakia’s sovereignty”<sup>51</sup> without the “slightest trace of legality.”<sup>52</sup>

As a result of the mounting international pressure to end the blatant violation of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union was forced to admit the legality of the government they had tried to depose, and reinstall it back into power. Party First Secretary Alexander Dubcek, President Ludvik Svoboda and other leading reformers returned to their posts on August 27, 1968. This act

marked the utter political failure of the Soviet Union to achieve their principal aim: the quick installation of an anti-reform government in Czechoslovakia. They did not even attempt to substitute a collaborationist government, since it was obvious that it would not last because of the hostility of the population.

When National Assembly President Josef Smrkovsky spoke on Czechoslovak Radio on August 29, 1968, shortly after returning from Moscow, he heartily thanked his “dear fellow citizens...[for]...your loyalty...[which has gained]...admiration throughout the world. This was our greatest source of strength in the immensely difficult task that we had to cope with.”<sup>53</sup>

Indeed, during the critical first week of the invasion, the radio proved to be a tool for the enhancement of the unity of the population. With its peaceful, organized resistance, the radio demonstrated to the whole world the injustice of the invasion, which in turn led to important concessions from the Soviet Union, especially their re-installation to power of the pro-reform government.

## Conclusion

On August 27, 1968, the leaders of Czechoslovakia returned from Moscow. “Haggard, bone-tired from the ordeal, looking as if he might drop from exhaustion at any moment,”<sup>54</sup> Party First Secretary Alexander Dubcek “faced the nation.”<sup>55</sup> The news was not good: he announced that Czechoslovakia’s fate was not up to her alone, and that temporary measures would have to be taken to limit the freedom of the means of communication. In effect, censorship was to be restored.

Nevertheless, there was something to rejoice over, and it was expressed by a wearied Smrkovsky, who broadcast on the radio saying, “We have all come back, including Kriegel.”<sup>56</sup>

Originally, the USSR’s hope had been that the government of Czechoslovakia would be deposed overnight, preferably by a *coup* acted out by Soviet collaborators. The reform-minded

members of government were to be replaced, and there were even plans to put them “on trial for ‘treason’ and to execute them quickly.”<sup>57</sup> However, the August 20, 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia encountered unplanned, massive public resistance. The focus of this resistance emerged as a clandestine radio network, which informed, directed, warned and reassured the population.


The crucial days of the invasion occurred from August 21, 1968 to August 27, 1968. During this time, the fate of the Czechoslovak government was in fact being decided in Moscow, and with it the fate of all of Czechoslovakia. Because of the Soviet invasion, and because the key government leaders had been removed to Moscow for negotiations, the government in Prague was unable to operate efficiently. Instead, the Czechoslovak radio naturally assumed the role of substitute government through its continuous broadcasts to the nation.

The radio was able to contribute heavily to the organization and encouragement of national unity and passive resistance, and to demonstrate these vividly to other nations. As a result, international pressure on the Soviet Union grew to end what was widely seen as a violation of Czechoslovakia’s national sovereignty. Thus, the USSR was brought to accept a major setback, and to return to power the original, pro-reform government of Czechoslovakia. Although the government henceforth took a much less radical line, an important part of the Czechoslovak Communist Party reform program was nevertheless realized: Czechoslovakia became a federal union of Czechs and Slovaks on January 1, 1969.<sup>58</sup>

Eventually, the Communism propagated by the USSR was restored through the process of “normalization,” but the transition was made slowly.<sup>59</sup> Gustav Husak, who replaced Antonin Dubcek as party leader early in 1969, had been only moderately involved in the reform movement of 1968; he was, however, sympathetic to it. The new government re-installed censorship and expelled chief reformists. Yet throughout 1969 it did not expressly reject the main beliefs of the reform movement, nor did it admit that the Soviet invasion had been justified by the supposed

danger of counterrevolution.<sup>60</sup> Although it finally agreed to this version of events late in 1970, the purges pressed for by the ultras never fully materialized. Antonin Novotny was fully readmitted to the party by 1971, and Husak declared “normalization” an accomplished fact.

The events of 1968 were officially forgotten, but the unity of the nation, the extensive passive resistance, and the guiding role of the radio remained vivid in the minds of many of those who experienced them.<sup>61</sup> The commentator who had become so well-known during the first week of the invasion, as he was speaking on Prague Radio for the last time on August 28, 1968 described the sentiments he felt towards the coming years, quite probably echoing those of many others: “People, from now on you will have to think about what you read and hear...Above all, let us stay together now...together it will be easier to endure...Remember the words we spoke to you on the first day of the occupation: calm and courage!”<sup>62</sup>



<sup>1</sup> Institute of History of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, The Czech Black Book (1969) p.32

<sup>2</sup> Mastny, Czechoslovakia: Crisis in World Communism (1972) pp. 7-8, where the author writes about the “democratization trend” taking place in Czechoslovakia following the publishing of the new party program, which embodied proposals for change.

<sup>3</sup> Schwartz, Prague’s 200 Days: The Struggle for Democracy in Czechoslovakia (1969) p. 154

<sup>4</sup> Mastny, p. 7

<sup>5</sup> Schwartz, p. 162

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 181

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 76

<sup>8</sup> Menges, Prague Resistance, 1968: The Ingenuity of Conviction (1968) p. 2

<sup>9</sup> Interviews with Pavel Brazda, Vera Novakova, July 17-18, 1995; Ladislav Sevcik, Vera Sevcikova, July 24, 1995; Vladimir Sevcik, June 23, 1995; Zita Sevcikova, July 14, 1995; Jana Hejmalova, July 22, 1995; Marta Bilkova and Petr Bilek, July 25-6, 1995

<sup>10</sup> The Institute of History of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, The Czech Black Book (1969) p. 191

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 198

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 103

<sup>13</sup> Wechsberg, The Voices (1969) pp. 99-100

<sup>14</sup> Interview with Zita Sevcik, July 14, 1995

<sup>15</sup> Wechsberg, The Voices (1969) p. 41

<sup>16</sup> Schwartz, p. 221

<sup>17</sup> The Czech Black Book, p. 30

<sup>18</sup> Schwartz, p. 212

<sup>19</sup> The Czech Black Book, p. 62

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 75

<sup>21</sup> Wechsberg, p. 57

<sup>22</sup> James, The Czechoslovak Crisis 1968 p. 144

<sup>23</sup> The Czech Black Book, p. 85

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 41

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 118

<sup>26</sup> Interviews with Pavel Brazda and Vera Novakova, July 17-18, 1995

<sup>27</sup> The Czech Black Book, p. 165

<sup>28</sup> Menges, p. 2

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 4

<sup>30</sup> Wechsberg, p. 104

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 71

- <sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 93
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 93
- <sup>34</sup> Prazsky Srpen (August in Prague)—translation by the author [Lea Sevcik] (1969) p. 45
- <sup>35</sup> Wechsberg, p. 78
- <sup>36</sup> Menges, p. 2
- <sup>37</sup> Michael Randle, April Carter and others, Support Czechoslovakia (1969) p. 8
- <sup>38</sup> Menges, p. 8
- <sup>39</sup> Schwartz, p. 221
- <sup>40</sup> The Czech Black Book, p. 113
- <sup>41</sup> Golan, Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia: The Dubcek Era 1968-1969 (1973) p. 245 Golan writes that the “courageous stand being put up by the population at home...prevented the...establishment of anti-reform government...this...was an impressive achievement.”
- <sup>42</sup> Wechsberg, p. 93
- <sup>43</sup> The Czech Black Book, p. 152
- <sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 211
- <sup>45</sup> Mastny, p. 78
- <sup>46</sup> James, p. 112
- <sup>47</sup> Randle, Carter and others, p. 8, where they write that the radio was “both essential for...[the Czechoslovak peoples’]...morale, a symbol of continuing resistance, and a means of keeping their cause before the rest of the world.”
- <sup>49</sup> Golan, p. 243
- <sup>49</sup> Schwartz, p. 277
- <sup>50</sup> James, p. 87
- <sup>51</sup> Schwartz, p. 277
- <sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 277
- <sup>53</sup> The Czech Black Book, p. 272
- <sup>54</sup> Schwartz, p. 236
- <sup>55</sup> Ibid., p. 236
- <sup>56</sup> The Czech Black Book, p. 235
- <sup>57</sup> Schwartz, p. 216
- <sup>58</sup> Mastny, p. 179
- <sup>59</sup> Interview with Vladimir Sevcik, June 23, 1995
- <sup>60</sup> Mastny, p. 180
- <sup>61</sup> Interviews with Vera Konecna, July 18, 1995, Pavel Bilek and Marta Bilek, July 25-26, 1995
- <sup>62</sup> Wechsberg, p. 137

[No Bibliography was made available by the author]

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